FBIS DAILY REPORT

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AJATI SIGNS 1986 TRADE AGREEMENT WITH GDR

AU031402 Tirana ATA in English 0930 GMT 3 Nov 85

[Text] Tirana, November 3 (ATA) -- The protocol on the exchange of goods and payments for 1986 was signed between the Government of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the Government of the German Democratic Republic, in Tirana, on November 2.

The protocol was signed for the Albanian side by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Pajtim Ajati and for the German side by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Dietrich Lemke.

Attending the signing ceremony were the members of the two delegations. Present was also the interim charge d'affaires of the embassy of the German Democratic Republic in Tirana Dieter Kulitzka.

The People's Socialist Republic of Albania will export to the GDR chrome ore, copper wires, ready made garments, artistic products, tobacco and cigarettes, cognac, different agricultural crops, etc, and will import product of chemical industry, machineries and equipment, chemicals, potassium fertilizers, iron rods, etc.

Over its stay in our country, the delegation was received by the Minister of Foreign Trade Shane Korbeci.

'DYNAMIC' DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH EVIDENCE SINCE 1945

AU012110 Tirana ATA in English 0920 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Tirana, November 1 (ATA) -- The triumph of the people's revolution in our country created the objective conditions for a vigorous and dynamic growth of the population. From 1945 onwards the population has increased by 1,800,000 inhabitants at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent. The high rates of the population growth and their stability are a result of the pronatal policy of our state, the efforts to raise the level of the standard of living and improve the health of the working masses.

The natural increase of the population has been achieved through the progressive rise of births and the falling of the death number. More than half of the population is under 22 years old and the population over 60 account for only 7.7 percent of the total population.

The able-bodied population in our country comprises men in the 15-59 age group and women in 15-54 age bracket. Today this population constitute 57 percent of the total population. The high rates of the increase of the population during the entire period of the socialist construction have brought about speedy increase of the number of able-bodied people. Today, as against 1970, the total population has increased 35.6 percent, whereas over the same period, the able-bodied population has jumped 57.4 percent, at average annual rates of 46,000 people.

ATA DELEGATION RETURNS FROM ITALY 31 OCTOBER

AU011804 Tirana ATA in English 0735 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Tirana, November 1 (ATA) -- The delegation of the Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA) headed by its director Taqo Zoto, which at the invitation of Italian press agency (ANSA) made a visit to the Italian Republic, returned home.

PARTY BODIES APPROVE PACT SUMMIT RESULTS

AU011936 Sofia BTA in English 1832 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Sofia, November 1 (BTA) -- The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist party, the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria have been presented with an information about the work of the session of the Political Consultative Committe of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, which was held in Sofia on October 22 and October 23, 1985, and fully approved the activities of the Bulgarian delegation headed by Mr Todor Zhivkov, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist party and president of the State Council.

The Politburo the State Council and the Council of Ministers agree completely with the analysis of the current situation in Europe and in the world, made by the session. They assess highly the unanimously adopted declaration which contains the coordinated line of the Warsaw Treaty member-states as regards the topical issues of the current international situation. The declaration is a comprehensive and realistic program for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict, for the halting of the arms race, for detente and the strengthening of peace. The conclusion drawn at the session, according to which the world has come close to the point beyond which events go out of control, has determined the need to have a positive turn in the present development of international relations.

The declaration's complete support for the U.S.S.R.'s constructive position at the Geneva negotiations, for the U.S.S.R.'s unilateral steps of goodwill and its new peace initiatives, is of great significance.

Stating their support for the normalization of international contacts in the field of economics, science and technology, for the establishment of a new international economic order, the Warsaw Treaty member-states are proposing a broad international techno-scientific cooperation of a global nature and limited to peaceful purposes only. This is an expression of the socialist community countries' desire to have all countries, small and large, developing and developed, actively involved in the development of techno-scientific progress and in the utilization of its achievement.

The Politburo, the State Council and the Council of Ministers emphasize especially upon the spirit of unity, friendship and cooperation, characteristic of the session. The session has confirmed the Warsaw treaty member-states' desire to strengthen their political and military alliance, to raise to a qualitatively new level their cooperation and unity of action in all fields upon the basis of the successfull merging of national and international interests, to work for the strengthening of the unity and might of the world socialist system.

The holding of the session of the Political Consultative Committee on the eve of the Soviet-American top level meeting in Geneva makes the session's decision especially important. The fraternal socialist states have unanimously supported the Soviet Union's constructive approach to this meeting.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria together with the fraternal socialist states will give its contribution to the implementation of the platform, developed by the session, and will do everything possible for the Warsaw Treaty member-states' Sofia appeal to the government's states and peoples of Europe and the world to reach to the hearts and minds of all people who hold dear the fate of space and human civilization.

FURTHER REPORTAGE ON AGCA TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

AU011802 Sofia BTA in English 1311 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Rome, November 1 (BTA corr.) -- Today the name of the neofascist assassin Mehmet Ali Agca appeared once again on the pages of the Italian press. It was also entered into the records of the trial against the "Revolutionary Committee" of the terrorist organization "The Red Brigades" in the region of Tuscany, which opened in the armoured hall near the "Santa Verdiana" prison in Florence.

One of the chief defendants at the trial is Giovanni Senzani. This former lecturer in criminal law at the Universities in Pisa and Siena and ideologist of the "Red Brigades" was arrested in January 1982 in Rome and in a few months he was transferred in the "isolation" department of the Ascoli Piceno Priso, where Ali Agca was already held. A number of Italian journalists have already written that Giovanni Senzani has taught the Turkish terrorist Italian.

Now the leader of the "Red Brigades" denied this, but added a few interesting details: "One day when I was in isolation at the Ascoli Piceno Prison, from a cell next to mine the Turk Ali Agca tried to establish contact. There was no communication apart from the exchange of some generalities from the cells which I stopped when Agca told me that he wanted to be regarded as the repentant of the repentants. It was not difficult to grasp where this initiative came from. I have never had anything to do with provocateurs."

Giovanni Senzani did not specify when these contacts began and ended, which does not exclude the possibility for this "exchange of generalities" to have continued for quite a time and to have contributed to the perfection of the Turkish neofascist's command of the Italian language. However, he had come to the conclusion that Agca was a provocateur. His evidence makes it obvious that he had understood the source of "this initiative".

The definition given by Senzani to the assassin and slanderer completes the portrait of Agca outlined by a number of witnesses and had maintained contacts with him at "Foro Ialico". "Ali Agca is a great liar" -- this was the unanimous and categorial statement of Sirri Kaden, Abdullah Catli and the "Grey Wolf" Mehmet Sener who was interrogated last week in Switzerland. Now, at another Italian trial, Senzani has defined him as a provocateur.

Here it would be appropriate to put a few questions: What is the paid assassin who has refused to appear in the court room doing now? May be his great slandering talents have been harnessed into the preparation of a new provocation? Will the innocent people accused by him be finally totally acquitted or will his mission of a provocateur continue?"

ALEKSANDROV COMMENTS ON ENERGY CONSERVATION

AU012014 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] A meeting of the party, state, and public aktiv of the Maritsa-Iztok Energy-Industrial Complex has taken place. Comrade Chudomir Aleksandrov, chairman of the Party and State Commission on Energy Problems, participated in the meeting. Mincho Yovchev, Stara Zagora Okrug BDP Committee first secretary, also took part in the meeting. The tasks faced by the workers collectives regarding work in the winter period in the light of the decisions on achieving optimal utilization of energy capacities, were discussed.

Comrade Chudomir Aleksandrov stressed the great importance of this vital center of our power supply and spoke on the necessity of strictly observing labor and technological discipline and a strict saving regime, most economically using the material-energy resources, and making a contribution to normally supplying our system with energy during the winter period.

CPCZ CONTROL COMMISSION DELEGATION ENDS VISIT

AU011628 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] On 1 November the visit to Bulgaria of the delegation of the CPCZ Central Control Auditing Commission led by its chairman, Jaroslav Hajn, ended. The delegation had talks with the leadership of the BCP Central Control-Auditing Commission led by its chairman, Stoyan Karadzhov. Satisfaction was expressed with the increasing development of relations of friendship and cooperation between the two parties and countries, and with the close beneficial cooperation and exchange of opinions between the two parties' central control organs.

The CSSR guests were also briefed on the BCP's Central Control-Auditing activity.

FILIPOV, LEADERS ATTEND BURGAS COMMISSIONINGS

AU021924 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] On the eve of the 68th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 90th anniversary of the Burgas party organization, the working people of the Burgas Okrug have made new gains. In the center of Burgas the biggest trade center in Bulgaria for fish and fish products was commissioned. It has six restaurants. In the Slavekov apartment complex the largest trade center in the country for household goods has also been commissioned. The working people of the Ruen village agro-industrial complex received a new fruit warehouse, in which thousands of tons of fruit will be stored throughout the year in accordance with new technologies.

The new projects were commissioned today by Grisha Filipov, chairman of the Council of Ministers. The ceremony was attended by Aleksandur Petkov, chairman of the Central Council of the National Agroindustrial Union; Nikolay Zhishev, Burgas Okrug BCP Committee first secretary; and other city and okrug leaders.

ATANASOV RECEIVES MSZMP COMMITTEE GROUP

AU311934 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Text] On 31 October Comrade Georgi Atanasov received the working group of the MSZMP Central Committee led by Kalman Vidovszki, deputy head of the MSZMP Central Committee Science, Education, and Culture Department, which is visiting Bulgaria. The guests were briefed on the preparations for the 13th BCP Congress. Information was exchanged on the two parties' experience in the work of the party organizations in health protection enterprises.

DUTCH DEPLOYMENT DECISION IGNORED PUBLIC OPINION

LD021129 Prague CTK in English 1034 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] The Hague, Nov 2 (CTK correspondent) -- The Netherlands Government last night gave its final approval to the siting of U.S. cruise missiles on Dutch territory, submitting to the long-standing and growing pressure of U.S. and NATO militaristic circles which reached a peak during a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels this week.

Premier Lubbers thus also saved his centre-right coalition government in which the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) threatened to withdraw from the government and cause a crisis if the siting was not approved.

By giving a go ahead to the missile deployment, the government completely ignored the demands of public opinion. The Dutch people last Saturday [26 October] clearly expressed their opposition to the missiles in a nation-wide campaign in which 3.75 million signatures were collected. The government session took place amid demonstrations of tens of thousands of students in The Hague, Utrecht, Amsterdam and other cities. Trains were halted, one independent radio station beamed siren whistle at regular intervals.

Representatives of main peace organizations warned already before yesterday's decision that nation-wide anti-missile campaigns will continue and culminate next May when general elections will be held in the Netherlands.

The government's armament decision is yet to be approved by the second chamber of parliament. The cabinet has already created necessary preconditions for this. Last week, deputies of government parties, supported by extreme right wing, voted to approve the decision that an overall majority will be sufficient to endorse the deployment, and not a two-thirds majority as was demanded by opposition parties with reference to the constitution.

Friday's vote of the Netherlands Government, confirming escalation of the deployment of first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe, demonstrates U.S. attitude to the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit and East-West disarmament talks. It confirms that there is a great difference between what the U.S. Administration says and what it does. President Reagan's attempts to legalize the militarization of space by "peace" initiatives makes the picture of these initiatives complete.

Fate Now in U.S. Hands

LD030044 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Michael Cermak commentary]

[Text] Michal Cermak comments on yesterday's decision by the Netherlands Government consenting to the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles on its territory:

[Cermak] There was no surprise in the Netherlands. This country, the last sheep which might have accidentally strayed, has obediently joined the flock -- it was enough for the U.S. to show his teeth and give a threatening growl, as happened with neigboring Belgium in the spring. Indeed, as soon as this sheep became part of the flock, congratulations and broad smiles immediately replaced threatening growls.

Almost simultaneously with Prime Minister Lubbers press conference in The Hague, where he announced that his government agreed to the deployment, the State Department expressed its exceptional satisfaction. Allegedly nobody in Washington had any doubts that the Netherlands, just like the other four countries of Western Europe, would fulfill its obligations toward NATO.

For the Netherlands, this means that it will allow the Pentagon to deploy cruise missiles at an airbase in the south of the country. All the 48 missiles aimed toward the East will be a constant reminder for the Netherlands of their place in the present divided world and who now decides their fate. Although the launching pads will be firmly embedded in Dutch soil, the push-buttons for launches will be placed on the table of the U.S. President. That, by the way, is where all the contacts from Americans medium-range nuclear missiles lead -- missiles which are beginning to make Western Europe look like a hedgehog. The reason for this is that the White House leaves nothing to chance.

Plans for ruling the world presuppose unqualified obedience by the United States' allies. During past decades, such obedience was safely ensured through various Marshall Plan-like schemes and through ties perpetuated by various military alliances. But what was sufficient in the past is not sufficient today, in the era when playing with increasingly more destructive weapons brings about justified concern about the fate of mankind among the majority of people. This kind of concern appears in Western Europe too. Increasingly higher number of Western Europeans are concerned about U.S. militaristic tendencies to escalate arms expenditure, its policy based on a position of force, and its unwillingness to achieve effective arms control. The plan for additional deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe offered the strategists in Washington a solution for several goals, the first being that the means of first strike will be many thousand miles closer to their eastern targets. At the same time Western Europe will be put into the position of being a nuclear hostage. These plans simply had to be implemented at any price by the Washington reactionaries, and contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of people of the countries concerned with this alleged upgrading of NATO armaments.

In this respect, the Netherlands occupied last place. In this country, where there are very strong traditions of national independence, resistance to the U.S. nuclear weapons did not slacken even when it became obvious that the Lubber's Conservative government would give in to Washington's pressure. This became very noticeable in recent days. A petition signed by almost 4 million people, and demonstrations rejecting deployment. reminded the government to consider the views of the majority of Netherlanderlands, and of fact that the struggle against the U.S. nuclear cruise missiles is not and cannot be considered lost. National independence and an improved political climate in Europe are at stake.

REAGAN ARMS PROPOSALS SIMPLY 'VARIANT' OF OLD

LD032143 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Jiri Cebrovsky commentary]

[Text] Everyone has been waiting, with appropriate curiosity, for the response of the U.S. Government to the new Soviet peace proposals, presented several weeks ago by the highest Soviet representative, Mikhail Gorbachev. This time Washington could not get away with the usual phrase, namely that it is the usual Moscow ploy; it had to declare that it is studying the proposals carefully. The significance and value of the Soviet disarmament proposals simply cannot be denied, let alone ignored. Reagan himself, and his staff, have in the past few days appeared like tired runners exposed to the sights of millions of viewers.

The fear of oxygen starvation was handled by the U.S. President on several levels: The U.S. military budget for the coming fiscal year was announced. It is an astronomic sum of over $300 billion. Even the [word indistinct] government bowed under the White House whip and consented to the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles on its territory and, at the same time, Ronald Reagan announced that the time for study is over and that he is proposing responses to the Soviet disarmament proposals. All this occurred in 1 week, at the end of October and the beginning of November.

According to the U.S. President, his proposals represent a contribution by the United States to achieving a real reduction in nuclear weapons, to strengthening stability and tackling problems, while taking into account the justified interests of the United States and the USSR. This formula may raise hope, but also pessimism. What has leaked to the public, through indiscretions of the press and from some U.S. politicians, makes it possible to think that Reagan has proposed a variant of his old proposals on reducing the stock of offensive strategic weapons. This, in fact, follows the old aim: seeking to enhance the arms potential of the United States with the idea of gaining military superiority over the USSR using the roundtable in Geneva for this purpose.

It also emerges from Reagan's response that there is no change in the principles of the approach to the U.S. program of antimissile defence with [word indistinct] in space. This was confirmed by Defense Secretary Weinberger, who resolutely declared that the United States has no intention of giving up the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative or to conduct talks about. The daily NEW YORK TIMES has written, I quote: The United States is able to permit the USSR to take part in any U.S. space defense technology -- end of quote. This sound like a generous proposal for some, but is it really so magnanimous? One can hardly think that Ronald Reagan was motivated here by unselfish aims.

The contrary is true. The USSR's aim is not to take part in the militarization of space in any form. Its aim is to do away with the possibility of space becoming engulfed by new weapons. The United States proposal, is, therefore, an attempt to involve the USSR in the space arms race and is masked by a notion of some sort of mutual cooperation. The U.S. aim is to legalize what has entered the vocabulary of the modern times as the so-called "star wars." And if the United States refuses to talk at all about the militarization of space, one has to remember a basic fact: There is simply no point of talking about any limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons without tackling the question of how to avert the militarization of space.

If we are looking for substance in the response of the U.S. President to the Soviet peace initiatives, one cannot but suspect that, for the most part, it is a rhetorical exercise whose aim is to influence the public prior to the Geneva summit and to present the U.S. attitudes as the only way out of the maze of the arms race. It is an attempt to push through the old principles of U.S. policy in new conditions, only to give them a new wrapping. However, one cannot fail to notice that these attitudes did not generate progress during earlier talks and one can hardly hope that it will be different in the coming days or months.

U.S. Still Seeks Superiority

LD931128 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 0830 GMT 3 Nov 85

["Commentary on the International Events of the Past Week" by editor Jindrich Malota]

[Excerpt] The Soviet peace policy has been meeting quite logically with great response and support among an ever-growing section of the international public.

This fact has at last forced the United States Government this week to react more seriously to the extensive peace proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to France and to the important peace initiatives that came out of the Sofia meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries. At a press conference held in the White House last Friday [1 November] Ronald Reagan, the American president, announced that the United States had put forward new proposals at the Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear weapons in Geneva. In contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev, the American President did not specify in any detail the essence of these proposals; therefore, political observers so far have had to fall back on analyzing statements made by various other representatives of the United States Administration. Everything so far indicates that the White House is still being guided primarily by the effort to acquire military superiority over the Soviet Union. The proposals mentioned do not touch on the questions of the militarization of space, despite the fact that this in itself constitutes one of the principal problems in ensuring international security, and despite the fact that the Soviet Union has put forward important proposals on this very issue.

The United States, on the contrary, stated emphatically through the mouths of various representatives that it does not intend to retreat from its so-called 'star wars' program.

Another feature of the U.S. proposals is the continuing effort to force on the Soviet Union a reduction in the number of weapons in that area where the Soviet Union has concentrated most of its weapons, which means in land-based strategic nuclear missiles. Meanwhile, in those areas where the United States enjoys superiority, especially in submarine-based missiles and in the number of strategic nuclear bombers, the existing correlation of weapons is to be maintained. It is not difficult to understand that these U.S. proposals, which the bourgeois media have begun to praise loudly, are designed above all to calm down world public opinion that is criticizing the existing American attitude to this vitally important issue of today. What is therefore involved are not proposals, but rather a new attempt to enforce U.S. superiority.

This has been indirectly confirmed by the American course taken at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO, which met in Brussels in the middle of last week, and the increased pressure by the White House on the Netherlands Government, which gave its consent on Friday evening -- against the will of the overwhelming majority of the people of its country and in variance with its previous statements on the conditions which it would consider -- to the deployment of 48 American first-strike nuclear missiles on its territory. Thus, less than 3 weeks before the American-Soviet summit in Geneva, question marks hang over the sincerity of the United States Government's endeavor to achieve an honorable agreement beneficial to both sides as well the whole world.

U.S. 'Falsifying' Weapons Counts

LD021643 Prague International Service in Czech and Slovak 0800 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated at a press conference in London that an approximate balance exists at the moment between the Soviet Union and the United States in strategic arms. This balance was agreed during the preparation of the SALT II agreement in 1979 and is valid today. The number of the Soviet Union's strategic forces has recently become the object of unashamed manipulation by certain circles in Washington.

If we look, for example, at the Pentagon brochure, Soviet Military Power in 1985, the falsifyers claim that they are not taking into consideration the more than threefold supremacy of the United States in the field of strategic bombers, and they speak about the vast supremacy of the Soviet Union.

Similar methods of counting the strategic balance for the public at large are also used by the Pentagon in the area of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles fired from submarines, and a number of nuclear battle charges.

The present government is distorting the true ratio of the forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States in this eay, in order to justify an unprecedented increase in American military forces. By publishing false information, Washington wants to distract the public's attention from the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union, which recently proposed a reduction by 50 percent of the numbers of nuclear weapons belonging to the Soviet Union and the United States. In defiance of logic, U.S. representatives are trying to convince the public that such a reduction would strengthen the supremacy of the Soviet Union for all time. Mutual parity is, however, a significant guarantee to secure peace and international security.

RUDE PRAVO ON IMPORTANCE OF CPSU PROGRAM

AU301322 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 28 Oct 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Inspirational Force of the CPSU Program"]

[Text] On Saturday [26 October] we published the draft of the new edition of the third CPSU Program which was adopted on 16 October by the CPSU Central Committee session. With this program the preparation of the 27th congress of Lenin's party has entered a new phase. Millions of Soviet Communists, and together with them the other Soviet people, will be studying this important party document; they will be acquiring its ideas, pondering over its new tasks, and discussing how to proceed to improve their work on its basis and how better to resolve the problems of the further development of Soviet society.

For the Communist movement, which carries out its activities on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, the Program is a weighty document. It must precisely characterize the phase of development that has been reached and, without going into details, it must clearly formulate the main tasks of all spheres of social development. The Program connects scientific theory with the party's practical struggles. It is a clear and precise expression of what the party is striving to achieve and what it is fighting for. It lists the goals to which it wants to lead the working people and the tasks for the fulfillment of which it intends to win the working people's active support.

The third CPSU Program was adopted by the 22d CPSU Congress almost 25 years ago. During the intervening period significant changes have taken place in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet economy and other spheres of social life have developed. Changes have also taken place in international relations.

Many of the tasks set at the time have meanwhile been fulfilled. It has become apparent that some formulations have not passed the test of time and had to be reassessed. Now, a quarter of a century later, the Soviet Communists see a number of things in a sharper light. That also had to be reflected in the document. Because, in fact, loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism also means the need to develop them in keeping with changing conditions.

Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev states in this context at the CPSU Central Committee session: "Consistency and continuity in theory at the same time necessarily envisage the creative development of theory, and also its enrichment by fundamental precepts in harmony with historical experience. This is quite natural. Now we can imagine far better and clearer the ways of improving socialism and achieving or programmatic goal, communism."

The programmatic goals formulated by the CPSU in the above document are based on the precise characterization of the contemporary international situation, in which the positions of real socialism are being consolidated, in which on the one hand the authority and influence of real socialism is growing, while on the other the resistance of reactionary imperialist forces against the positive changes in the world is escalating at the same time. The main features of the policy pursued by the imperialist powers, above all the United States, are becoming more and more strikingly apparent: the endeavor to achieve military supremacy over socialism, to suppress progressive movements, and to maintain international tension on a level that would make it possible to demand ever-newer kinds of weapons and to open further and further rounds of feverish armament.

The new edition of the third CPSU Program is a comprehensive expression of the Soviet concept of world peace and social progress, the document formulates the unwavering basic principles of the CPSU's policy. At the same time, the program shows the CPSU's broad approach to the international situation, and also its ability, as stated by M. Gorbachev, "to take into account in good time the changes in the situation, to see reality without prejudice, to objectively appraise what is happening, and to react flexibility to the demands of the moment."

In keeping with the basic precepts of Marxist-Leninst theory, the Program proceeds -- as corresponds to the CPSU's political practice -- from the decisive role played by the economy in society's development. The long-term goals of this policy are aimed at the technological reconstruction of the Soviet economy, the further development of the revolution in research and development, and the implementation of the results in production and other spheres of social life. The changes in production relations must go hand in hand with this; their purpose is to establish conditions which would enable Soviet economic efficiency to reach world standards.

However, economic development is not, and cannot be, an end in itself; that is why the document emphasizes the broad concept of social policy. This policy takes into account all man's needs -- from his working and living conditions, care for his health and for his expedient use of free time, up tc the social and nationality relations between the people. As the Program stresses, this understanding of social policy makes it a significant medium for speeding up economic development and enhancing the people's working and sociopolitical activity. It is also an important factor contributing to shaping the new man and his social way of life.

The Program orients Soviet society toward further deepening and expanding socialist democracy, toward creating conditions for the people's broad participation in the solution of the economic, political, and cultural tasks which society is setting for itself. It emphasizes practical steps which expand the people's knowledge and information about the problems of social development and about the roads to their solution, about the enhancement of democratism in the activities of state agencies and social organizations, and about consistent control from below.

All this becomes prominent in the Program in inseparable unity with the education of people in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology, with educating them both by truthful word and actual deed.

The historical experience convincingly shows that the progressive ideas which the masses have adopted as their own, have become a powerful social force.

The new edition of the CPSU program is a document whose significance will reach far beyond the borders of the country of the Soviets. In time we will see the great inspiring force with which it affects the ranks of the international communist movement. The ideas expressed in this document are comprehensible for the working people in Europe and in Africa, in Asia and in America; and they will undoubtedly attract interest and provide an incentive to study the document for all those concerned about asserting lasting peace, social justice, and social progress in the world.

The creative approach to the problems and tasks of improving socialism, which is typical of the work of the CPSU and its Central Committee and which also permeates the new edition of the third CPSU Program, represents a contribution to and incentive for our own party, too. We, too, have embarked on the path of intensive development of the economy; we, too, are striving to achieve better efficiency and higher quality in production; we, too, see the main way to fulfill these tasks in the accelerated implementation of progress in research and development. We are resolving many issues that are totally new to us; and, as Comrade Gustav Husak stressed at the 15th CPCZ Central Committee session, we have the advantage of being able to rely on the CPSU's experience.

This experience has been generalized, thoroughly thought out, and formulated with scientific precision in the new edition of the CPSU Program. It will be a rich source of incentive and inspiration, both for thought and for action, also for us, Czechoslovak Communists.

BENO DISCUSSES GOALS OF ANNUAL MEMBERS' MEETINGS

AU281318 [Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 22 October carries on page page 3 a 3,200-word article by Mikulas Beno, CPCZ Central Committee secretary, entitled "Annual Meetings -- the Party's Starting Point in the Preparation of the 17th Congress." Beno begins by mentioning the significant and irreplaceable role which the annual members' meetings play in the Party's life. He elaborates on the agenda of these meetings, particularly this year when the meetings will be held in the light of the conclusions adopted last June by the 15th CPCZ Central Committee session on preparations for the 17th party congress and on tasks in implementing the party's economic and social program.

Speaking of the political-organizational provisions for the coming party congress, Beno underscores the need to develop broad mass political, organizational, and ideological activity, to "assess collectively and in a critically demanding manner the results of past work, and to set clearcut, specific tasks for the Communists in the coming period." During the past 5 months, Beno continues, the fulfillment of tasks planned for the last year of the 5-year plan showed positive results "in industry, agriculture, the building industry, and in external economic relations, as well as in meeting the population's needs." He recalls that "at the beginning of September, the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium carried out an overall appraisal of the way the conclusions of the CPCZ Central Committee's June session are being ensured, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere," and that the Presidium appraised the way "the realization of the strategic plans set for society's development is reflected in the contents" of annual members' meetings that are now in preparation.

Beno states that: "The CPCZ Central Committee Presidium conference with the leading secretaries of the party's regional committees, which followed the September session, and the party economic aktiv meetings in regions and districts, which followed the conference, as well as the sessions of the committees of basic party organizations, have confirmed that it is most topical and necessary to appraise the situation on all levels prior to the annual members' meetings. It is necessary to orient the further course to be taken, and, on the basis of a critical and truthful view, to weigh how we are succeeding" in implementing in practice the results of all the above negotiations.

"Differing results achieved in fulfilling the line of the 16th congress, the lag in a number of enterprises, plants, and working places, and the not always resolute approach to the specification of tasks in the precongress period are all reducing the overall positive results and weakening the attainment of the main targets, as well as the good preparation of the Eighth 5-year Plan." Beno goes on to say that the Central Committee has therefore adopted measures for a party-wide, businesslike and honest analysis of the fulfillment of conclusions adopted by the 15th Central Committee session and for the adoption of "effective steps to eliminate shortcomings and to ensure the set tasks more consistently."

Beno then deals with the way in which the desirable turn in the intensification of the economy is dependent on corresponding changes in the people's way of thinking and their approach to work. He speaks of the laws governing the process of socialist reproduction and mentions the call addressed by "the CPCZ Central Committee Secretariat to all party members and candidate members to remember the urgent task: to master deeply and grasp the political line of congress preparation, and to become a true fighter for the party's policy by setting a personal example and by enforcing this policy at the workplaces."

After concentrating on the significance of the party congress and its preparation in society's life, and on the demand this places on individual Communists and party organizations, Beno continues: "The preparation of the 17th congress requires that we achieve a striking shift in all basic spheres, particularly in the intensification of production and in the entire reproduction, as well as in the further improvement of the economic mechanism and of the system of management, and in the consistent implementation of the party's leading role." He points out that "the moving force of the political organization of socialist society is based on the division of functions, in which the party leadership as the highest form" does not take over and replace direct management, but establishes conditions for it, perfects them, checks on them, and controls them.

Beno goes on to say that the party expects from all Communists a "high degree of engagement in all workplaces; a resolute effort aimed at fulfilling the progressive plans; support for the development of initiative; and the consolidation of order, responsibility, and discipline." He adds: This means that, in order to cope successfully with all these tasks, we must be more resolute in overcoming obsolete stereotypes in thinking and in practical activity; approach the solution of problems consistently and creatively"; and be prepared to assume responsibility for difficult tasks as an "expression of the unity of words and deeds, of the correct realization on the cadre policy, of firm links with the masses, of critical appraisal of the results achieved, and of an unappeasable attitude to all that is alien to party ideology and socialism."

Beno says that a businesslike, objective analysis of the specific situation in the sphere of activities of every party organization is a reliable basis in comparing plans and measures with the achieved results, and in critically rejecting all that bars our way.

The annual members' meetings will also assess the implementation of the Presidium letter under the conditions existing in the effective struggle against violations of socialist legality, morale, and discipline. Despite all effort and the party's support, Beno adds, there is often a merely verbal recognition of the need to fight abuse and shortcomings; the "measures adopted are often not resolute" enough; there is often a "lack of courage to resolve negative situations and to draw the necessary conclusions" with regard to thos causing them. Beno then calls for a greater party emphasis and principlemindedness in the solution of negative situations, and especially in prevention, which should leave no scope for violations of the principles of socialism in practice.

After saying that the annual members' meetings and party conferences should generalize the positive aspects of the development of party life in the organizations, and should also openly show their weaknesses, the causes of shortcomings and of lagging, and the ways to eliminate them, Beno recalls that no member should leave the meeting or conferemce without assuming responsibility for the conclusions adopted there -- "he should not remain in the anonymity of general criticism." The district party committees are responsible for the annual meetings being not merely formal affairs, Beno adds.

The prerequisite for annual meetings to take a favorable course, Beno goes on to say, is that the Communists "take an active party in preparing them; that they know the problems to be discussed and the measures to be proposed; and that the commitee reports speak clearly, specifically, critically, and in a businesslike manner on all basic aspects of the organization's activity and on the political-educational, working, and social issues of the working collective."

Although most party organizations and their committees and party groups have dealt informally with the Communists' activity in preparing the annual agenda, Beno continues, "it has not always been possible to orient their appraisals toward the fulfillment of specific tasks of basic significance -- to which the party statutes oblige each Communist -- such as, above all, to be a consistent fighter for the realization of the party's policy and to influence through personal example the people he is working and living with."

Beno then elaborates on the importance of implementing criticism and self-criticism in the activity of a party organization, of its committee, and of every Communist, as a powerful instrument for avoiding mistakes. This implementation cannot be ordered, Beno points out; it requires political and ideological maturity and moral firmness, as well as a comprehensive development of the life of party organizations on the principles of democratic centralism and intraparty democracy. It also requires high standards of organization and management of activities, and the full implementation of the right of control.

"The results of talks to members and candidate members," Beno continues, will undoubtedly influence the course of annual members' meetings and the businesslike and specific nature of adopted measures; "and, what is particularly important, the selection and election of committee members in basic organizations, the broader appraisal of the cadre situation, as well as the measures adopted in this sector, will take place in a creative and critically demanding spirit."

Beno then deals with the "highly responsible role of higher party agencies, and especially district committees," in helping, through the efficient management of the preparation and course of annual member meetings, the meetings to achieve the basic cadre goals.

It is also important, he continues, already today to refelct on the efficient organization of the practical implementation of adopted resolutions after the annual meetings and conferences, and on those spheres where the management of party organizations will have to be improved and the development of elected functionaries deepened.

The vitality of basic organizations and their influence on working people within the sphere of their activities, Beno points out, depends above all on the Communists' activity, on their example in work and in life, and on the full development of their vanguard political role within the working collective. He concludes by saying that the creation of a healthy sociopolitical climate places great demands on the standards and efficiency of work accomplished by the committees and members of basic organizations, and especially by their leading cadres, "from whom we demand a consistently party-minded approach to the management of the sector entrusted to them." They must fully realize the important position held by basic party organizations under current conditions; they must make sure that "the working people everywhere can become convinced that the supreme party sessions do not evade burning and complicated issues of further work and that the Communists know about everyday problems, are resolving them, and are striving to achieve a further upsurge of our socialist fatherland."

BILAK INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT EVENTS, 1968

DW300721 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Oct 85 pp 167-174

[Interview with CPCZ Central Committee Secretary Vasil Bilak by editors Inge Cyrus and Klaus Reinhardt in the Prague Central Committee Building; no date given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Secretary, prior to his meeting with the U.S. President, Soviet party leader Gorbachev proposed that the Soviet Union would reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal by 50 percent if the United States were to renounce its space weapons. What results do you expect in Geneva?

Bilak: Regrettably, only the Soviet side has taken initiatives. The other side is waiting for unilateral concessions. The Soviet disarmament proposals of recent years already fill a large volume. However, the Americans have always rejected them, because they said the Moscow proposals were not new, they were propaganda -- just words, which must be followed by deeds.

SPIEGEL: This time the Soviet proposals were received with interest and positive comment.

Bilak: Yes, initially. Meanwhile, Reagan has given interviews where he gives Gorbachev gratuitous advice. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz has said quite clearly that the United States will under no circumstances renounce its space program. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's position is certainly well known to you.

SPIEGEL: That means that you are rather pessimistic regarding Geneva?

Bilak: Experience compels us to be careful, but we, of course, are hoping for positive results. The Soviet Union doubtless will go to the talks with great peace initiatives. It wants to prevent, at any price, any further rearmament and nuclear war.

SPEIGEL: The United States, too, actually wants to prevent nuclear war.

Bilak: We would like to believe that. The Americans must come to realize that nothing good can come of efforts aimed at achieving military superiority. Then there certainly can be agreement.

SPIEGEL: Are small countries actually in a position to bring any influence to bear on the Geneva summit talks?

Bilak: The question of whether the small and medium countries concerned could do something in preparation for the summit meetint depends on their position. However, we cannot lump together the socialist and the capitalist countries. The socialist countries need not urge the Soviet Union to pursue a peace policy, because the Soviet Union pursues the very policy that is in line with our desires.

SPIEGEL: Really?

Bilak: Yes. In this connection, I want to remind you of the 1983 Williamsburg conference. At the time, the representatives of the highly developed capitalist states appeared with the firm intention to enforce their common interests against the Americans.

However, in the end they all lined up, rank and file, and accepted Reagan's demands. Such a thing could not happen in the scope of CEMA or the Warsaw Pact.

SPIEGEL: How pleasant.

Bilak: The Soviet Union would never say to us: We are going to do it this way; anything else is out of the question.

SPIEGEL: Do all hold the same view?

Bilak: Naturally. On the other hand, in the West the peace movement people fight for peace, and how do you treat them?

SPIEGEL: Well, the members of the peace movement are people who vehemently protest against their own country's policy. Do you think it is possible to demonstrate against the Soviet SS-20's in the CSSR?

Bilak: Perhaps there are no SS-20's....

SPIEGEL: ...perhaps SS-25's?

Bilak: If missiles had been deployed in the CSSR without U.S. missiles being deployed 180 km from our border, our people could be rightly worried. However, that is not the case. Our people know that the missiles have only been deployed in the CSSR because U.S. missiles are deployed in the Federal Republic. If a thief prowls around your house do you just buy another castle, or a dog?

SPIEGEL: Mr Bilak, in a speech in Bratislava in April you compared the West's arms efforts with arming murderers and terrorists, while the socialist camp's armament was compared with arming police who provide for law and order. Were you serious?

Bilak: Every comparison is somewhat simplistic. What I mean to say is that our side does not want war and that we will attack no one, but in the event of a threat we need to have certain weapons for our defense.

SPIEGEL: Everyone says that. The deployment of missiles has led to a number of countermeasures by your socialist neighbors. For example, Romania suggested an immediate freeze on counterarmament by both sides. Bulgaria has stated that it will not deploy any missiles. In talks with the Federal Republic, the GDR is trying to find concrete ways to limit the damage. The CSSR is the only country to maintain a wait-and-see attitude. Why?

Bilak: You can believe me that we do coordinate our policy within the scope of the Warsaw Pact. For example, Bulgaria's situation is entirely different from ours. We are on the border of the Western world. If our country were Bulgaria, we would probably have the same policy.

SPIEGEL: So you agreed to the fact that Bulgaria deploys no missiles?

Bilak: Of course.

SPIEGEL: Do you also agree to what Romania is doing?

Bilak: Romania is doing nothing contrary to our interests. Do you believe that all socialist states should hold the same views?

SPIEGEL: We do not believe that at all. However, we are surprised. When the GDR and Hungary showed the slightest move toward a somewhat more independent foreign policy about a year ago, the Czechoslovak daily RUDE PRAVO had strong objections. At difficult times, it wrote, no socialist country was allowed to pursue its own course.

Bilak: RUDE PRAVO did not write it the way you are saying it. For us it is a matter of course that every socialist country advances to socialism in its own way. You see, no one wants to enforce a unified Soviet model in Eastern Europe.

SPIEGEL: Are you sure?

Bilak: Take us, for example. Several socialist countries changed their national flag. We did not. Several countries changed their national anthem. We did not. Several countries changed their coat of arms. We were satisfied with a small alteration: our lion is still a lion. Briefly, every one of us builds his own house. Whether it is large or small, with or without a porch, with large or small windows, only depends on the respective site and the respective forces. It is a matter of architecture. However, the foundation must be the same in all cases, otherwise the house might collapse.

SPIEGEL: What do you mean by foundation?

Bilak: Nationalization of the means of production, the leading position of the worker class and its vanguard, the Communist party, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, friendship with the Soviet Union, and efforts to unify the socialist community.

SPIEGEL: The custodian of that ideology, CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev, has not only taken initiatives internationally, but he has also set the tone for domestic policy with his campaign against corruption and alcoholism. Will there also be changes in the CSSR?

Bilak: To begin with, it is wrong to talk about a "new tone." Comrade Gorbachev only demands that his citizens observe those norms of Soviet society that were valid under Lenin. That also applies to the struggle against corruption. Corruption does not originate in our system.

SPIEGEL: Aha.

Bilak: It is a remainder of the bourgeois era, even though you may doubt that.

SPIEGEL: Other socialist states have long dropped this palliative thesis.

Bilak: I do not think that you are right. Eleven years ago, at the Central Committee plenum in November 1974, the CSSR decided to take tough measures against corruption. Since then, many people have been sentenced and struck off the roll of party membership. What Comrade Gorbachev is implementing is totally in line with our efforts.

SPIEGEL: So there is no forced campaign against corruption and alcoholism in the CSSR. Are there fewer "bourgeois remainders" in your country?

Bilak: I think your question is not formulated correctly. You cannot conduct a campaign from a desk. It is a long-term educational process during which people must learn what harms society, themselves, and their families. Naturally we still have many bourgeois remainders. How often have I had to remind myself that some things will eventually pass.

SPIEGEL: Is the enormous beer consumption in the CSSR decreasing at all?

Bilak: No, beer is bread for us.

SPIEGEL: Mr Bilak, the Soviet Union is primarily concerned with making its economy more efficient. Several Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, have at the same time come to the conclusion that the instruments of a planned economy are no longer adequate for modern development. Why is the CSSR hanging on to centralized control of the economy?

Bilak: The truth is that central planning will always continue everywhere. Nobody is abolishing it; not the Soviet Union, or any other socialist state. Basic questions such as investments or prices must be centrally resolved. Certainly, the question is raised as to what will control central planning in the future.

SPIEGEL: What is your answer?

Bilak: We are also searching for the most effective methods. We pay great attention to what others do; we monitor their experiments so that we can copy the positive aspects. But we do not rush into anything headlong. It is often said that people in the CSSR are lazy, but our 15 million people produce 15 million tons of steel, 116 million pairs of shoes, 10 million tons of cement. We mine 127 million tons of coal. We build 100,000 to 200,000 apartments. Could loafers manage all that? Could our people do that lying in bed?

SPIEGEL: Certainly not. However, cement and steel is also produced by developing countries such as India and Nigeria. Don't you doubt that your proud production list still offers the right things in 1985? Why does the CSSR not produce computers instead of steel, or semiconductors instead of cement?

Bilak: A legitimate question; however, we cannot do without steel and cement either. We have been working for years on structural change. We have done much in that respect.

However, it takes time. You cannot change mature structures from one day to the next. In addition, we must overcome the Western technology embargo. I do not say that we will succeed in 1-2 years. However, sooner or later we will succeed.

SPIEGEL: Mr Bilak, let us return from the distant future to the distant past. In August 1968 you belonged to the 40 top-ranking functionaries who asked the Soviet Union for "brotherly help" against the reformist course. Now 17 years have passed. Why are Soviet troops still in the country?

Bilak: They are here on the basis of a treaty concluded between the two governments. U.S. troops are in the FRG and in other Western European countries. When U.S. troops leave Western European territory, the Soviets will leave the CSSR. I am convinced of it. However, I don't know where you got the 40 top-ranking functionaries from.

SPIEGEL: Was it only 38?

Bilak: When the time is right, we will open the archives. Then you will learn how many there were.

SPIEGEL: Must we really wait for the archives? We consider you a central figure, maybe even the organizer of the requested help from Moscow, and we are more interested in your description.

Bilak: Central Committee members were among them and members of the Presidium, government, and parliament. I want particularly to stress that the Soviet appearance was not intervention, but truly brotherly help.

SPIEGEL: Absolutely selfless....

Bilak: Help was necessary. Without it Czechoslovakia would have gotten into civil war. It is not so hard to assess what would have happened then in Europe and in the world.

SPIEGEL: Civil war? In the summer of 1968 we saw masses of people cheering the party.

Bilak: Do you remember the conference of the Warsaw Pact states in the early days of August 1968. I will tell you something now that I have not told anybody. That session's document was not worked out by experts, as is usual. Party and government chiefs got together personally, formulating sentence by sentence the idea that the CSSR was threatened by counterrevolutionary overthrow, and that it was our common duty to defend socialist achievements.

Therefore, it was signed by all delegations, including the Czechoslovak delegation -- Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik, and me. I do not know why people in the West later began writing about the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. Unfortunately, our leadership broke its word, deciding to act against its promises. Something like that is intolerable, even among horse traders.

In politics and especially among allies, it is impossible. Therefore, the people you called top-ranking functionaries appealed to Moscow. Thousands of CSSR citizens approached the CPCZ Central Committee, feeling seriously alarmed. Did you know that in early August 1968 preparations were being made to set up concentration camps for the adversaries of rightist forces in Czechoslovakia?

SPIEGEL: No, we never heard of that.

Bilak: We did not make it public because people would have demanded, and rightly, the most serious punishment for those who planned them. However, we wanted a political settlement. As is known, nobody in Czechoslovakia had to face trial because of his counterrevolutionary activity.

SPIEGEL: The so-called "political solution" was a hard punishment for many people. They were ousted from the party and they lost their positions. Even today, hundreds of thousands cannot work, at least in their former positions, because they sympathized with the 1968 reformers.

Bilak: That is most untrue. Hundreds of thousands of people were not involved at all. However, I admit there are directors, ministers, or high-ranking officers who no longer work in their former positions. They did not stand the political tests. If a good singer loses his voice, he cannot sing in the opera anymore. If a world champion high jumper injures his leg, he cannot jump anymore. That is how it is. Those people in the FRG, too, who publicly act against state policy probably cannot work in the state employee apparatus anymore or elsewhere in a responsible position.

SPIEGEL: Mr Bilak, we could add up names and fates. We could speak of cases of arrests of whole families in the CSSR that are incomprehensible to us. More important to us is the basic question: Why did Czechoslovakia not go the Hungarian way, where party chief Janos Kadar won over those who had a different opinion of how to build the state? Why does a small country such as Czechoslovakia renounce cooperation with the spiritual elite?

Bilak: What you formulated in the beginning of your question is distorted. I repeat that in Czechoslovakia the counterrevolution was liquidated by political means. None of the counterrevolutionaries who had organized the putsch, who had intentionally prepared the civil war, had to face trial. You will hardly find a similar case in the world. Unforutnately, some people did not realize that this was generosity by a socialist state, and so they continue their provocations.

I do not know what spiritual elite you are talking about. Not one really significant and recognized scientific, artistic, cultural, economic, or political personality has left the republic. I do not know where you get that we renounced cooperation.

As for the next part of your question: I am glad to note that you like our friends and neighbors, the Hungarians. I am also very glad that Comrade Kadar enjoys such great prestige. But you could be a bit more objective in your assessment of our achievements, which are indeed recognized by the broad masses. What are the principles, anyway, by which you judge our system's quality?

SPIEGEL: The principles of Rosa Luxemburg: Freedom is, above all, freedom for those who dissent. You yourself said conditions in the CSSR were "normalized" a long time ago. Why does the party always react so nervously to every word of criticism? Do you consider a pluralist society absolutely inconceivable under communism?

Bilak: Certain people in the West obviously do not want to understand that a new social order has really developed. The transition from capitalism to socialism is logically effected. It is no error of history, as the U.S. President has said. It is the reality of history. Therefore, the restoration of the forms of bourgeois pluralism would be an anachronism for us, even cheating.

We proceed from our historic experience. Pluralism in the bourgeois republic prior to Munich in 1938 was a total failure. It did not guarantee the existence of the state, social justice, or justice for nationalities. We have a higher form of political system than bourgeois pluralism.

SPIEGEL: The CPCZ congress is scheduled for the spring of 1986. In the Soviet Union, General Secretary Corbachev separated the office of party leader from that of state president. Is such a separation also planned for the CSSR, where Gustav Husak holds both functions?

Bilak: I do not see any necessity for that. Gustav Husak is a qualified and healthy man. He enjoys high authority and is the most qualified person for those functions.

SPIEGEL: Do you personally expect to be assigned new tasks by the party congress?

Bilak: I really do not worry about that.

SPIEGEL: You do not worry, but perhaps you have hopes?

Bilak: I just do not deal with that.

SPIEGEL: Mr Bilak, we thank you for this talk.

FRENCH CP DELEGATION VISITS 30 OCT-3 NOV

LD032107 Prague CTK in English 1830 GMT 3 Nov 85

[Text] Prague, Nov 3 (CTK) -- A delegation of the French Communist Party [PCF], headed by Central Committee Politburo member and secretary Gaston Plissonnier, visited Prague October 30 to November 3.

During its stay, the delegation was received by Vasil Bilak and Milos Jakes, Presidium members and secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Representatives of the two parties exchanged information on the situation in their countries and the activities of the parties. The French Communist Party delegation visited Prague and the South Moravian region and became acquainted with the construction and successes of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The visit and the delegation's meetings with Czechoslovak officials took place in a cordial and comradely atmosphere. The French party delegation came to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

FURTHER REPORTAGE ON USSR'S MARCHUK VISIT

Talks With Honecker

LD011928 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1248 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Berlin, 1 Nov (ADN) -- Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, received today Guriy Marchuk, member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology.

Guriy Marchuk, who during his stay in the GDR has familiarized himself with the experiences of the SED and of the GDR Government in developing economic strategy in preparation for the 11th SED Congress, delivered warm greetings from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and from Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. These were warmly reciprocated by Erich Honecker.

Erich Honecker stressed the great significance of the results of the Political Consultative Committee session of the Warsaw Pact countries held in Sofia, which met with profound agreement and support from the citizens of the GDR and reinforced them in their determination to produce top performances to strengthen socialism as an effective contribution to the realization of peace.

The program of disarmament policy measures presented by Mikhail Gorbachev before the French National Assembly, and the initiatives contained in the Sofia statement point the way, Erich Honecker said, to arresting negative tendencies, to easing the tense international situation, and to continuing and deepening the process of European security and cooperation in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence. The GDR is guided by the fact that there is nothing more important than averting the danger of a nuclear inferno and assuring peace.

A decisive element of the coordinated efforts of our countries toward strengthening the forces of socialism and peace in the world is constituted, Erich Honecker stressed, by the economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between the GDR and the USSR, which has been proven over many decades and is becoming even deeper.

With the resolutions of the highest-level CEMA economic discussions, and with the programs for the development of scientific and technological cooperation stretching forward to the year 2000, we possess a good foundation on which to face up to all challenges with the forces and powers of our community.

Conscious of this historic responsibility, the SED and people of the GDR are putting enormous efforts into the preparation for the 11th SED Party Congress in order to considerably raise work effectiveness and to create, through mastery of key technologies, the decisive prerequisites for the subsequent continuation of our proven course of unity in economic and social policy.

With significant work output in the socialist competition for implementation of the economic plan for 1985, and multifarious creative ideas and far-reaching initiatives for the preparation of the resolutions of the 11th SED Congress and for their realization, the working people are contributing actively to strengthening our republic and thereby the overall potential of the socialist community.

Guriy Marchuk told Erich Honecker about important CPSU Central Committee resolutions which had been made in preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress.

Thanks to the perpetual attentiveness of the party and government to the development of science and technology, the USSR has at its disposal a capable scientific-technological potential. In the broad and ever more effective use of the results of the scientific-technological revolution and the adaptation of the forms of socialist economic management to the demands and needs of modern production, the CPSU sees decisive prerequisites for the intensification of the economy and the acceleration of socioeconomic progress.

Guriy Marchuk stated that an expression of the fraternal relations between our countries is the further strengthening and deepening of economic and scientific-technological cooperation in accordance with agreed long-term programs. He expressed his thanks to Erich Honecker for the opportunity given him to make himself acquainted with the performance of workers in GDR combines and factories, and gave special emphasis to the close cooperation of science and production in the struggle for efficiency and productivity.

Taking part in the discussion, which was conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and total agreement, were Guenter Mittag, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee; and Herbert Weiz, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister for science and technology. Vyacheslav Kochemasov, USSR ambassador to the GDR, was also present.

Protocol Signed

LD020038 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1800 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] A GDR-USSR protocol on scientific-technological cooperation until 1990 was signed today in Berlin by Herbert Weiz, deputy chairman of the Council of ministers, and Guriy Marchuk. Among the agreed tasks are the priority development and application of the most modern technology in production and preparatory processes, new nuclear energy equipment, materials and processes, and the utilization of biotechnology.

The successful cooperation between the GDR and USSR over the past decades was praised today by Erich Honecker and Guriy Marchuk as a decisive element in the strengthening of socialism and of world peace. The far-reaching programs are a good basis for meeting any challenge through joint strength.

Marchuk Interview

LD030045 East Berlin Domestic Service in German 2110 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Interview with Guriy Marchuk, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, and Dr. Herbert Weiz, deputy chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers and minister of science and technology, by correspondent Wolf Alexander Ortmann on the USSR-GDR science and technology cooperation protocol signed on 1 November in Berlin -- recorded]

[Text] [Ortmann] One certainly may classify the document just signed here as part of the effort to realize with determination the long term program in the fields of science, technology, and production up to the year 2000. Toward what will these joint measures in science and technology be directed?

[Marchuk in Russian with superimposed German translation as throughout] This program contains 400 problems, of which 13 have fruits of economic significance for our countries. If I were to say what the core of this program is, of this cooperation, then I can say that it is the most important technologies, from which the whole world lives, as well as both our countries.

The final aim of our developments is the preparation of a broad base for the modernization and the raising of work productivity with the help of automation. I therefore believe that the most important task that we have to accomplish is to reach the highest world level in engineering and technology and to use key technologies with a broad introduction of electronic and automated systems in our countries economies.

[Ortmann] It is a close cooperation of mutual advantage. For many years we have been practicing it with exemplary success. Perhaps a word about what potential lies at the disposal of our states today in order to fulfill these future tasks.

[Marchuk] The history of our interrelations in the fields of science, technology, and the economy shows that each of our countries has a very precisely-defined field of specialization in which cooperation brings significant successes for both countries economies. We therefore believe that we have a fully natural division of the areas, of the spheres, if we look at this question from a distance, if we look at it from above. I would like to put it in this way: Soviet science has at its disposal great reserves of basic fundamental ideas. Your country has as its disposal good science, as well as good technology. The next step after basic research is technology, for through technology, we reach the highest parameters of engineering, which affects the economy. If I am to speak of concrete directions, I would like to stress electronics, robot technology, and new materials. I believe that these three fields are of prime importance, and, if we add biotechnology to them, we get new possibilities for influencing all fields of the economy through scientific and technological progress.

[Ortmann] Minister Weiz, one can perhaps also say that an agreement of this sort is unique in the world, or is that going too far?

[Weiz] One can say that with certainty. One can perhaps even go a step further. Yesterday the long-term agreement on the exchange of goods for the 5-year-plan period was concluded in Moscow. It is a colossal plan, if you consider what huge scope this agreement has on the exchange of goods between our countries. Naturally, it is only possible at a very high level; we cannot expect to supply goods to each other to this extent at a low level. We have to solve the problems of the respective countries at this level. It fits in logically with this significant action which took place yesterday, [31 October] that 1 day later, the conditions also were laid down for science and technology, which must help us ensure the exchange of goods at a high level.

PHYSICIST 'SECRETLY' SENTENCED FOR ESPIONAGE

AU021423 Paris AFP in English 1344 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] Copenhagen, Nov 2 (AFP) -- An East German nuclear physicist who worked at the Nels Bohr Institute here has been secretly santenced to 11 years in prison for espionage by a military court in East Berlin, the liberal daily POLITIKEN reported today.

The institute was set up in the 1930's by the Nobel prize-winning Danish atomic theorist Niels Bohr as an international research center and forum for nuclear physicists from both East and West.

The head of the institute, Knud Hansen, told the paper that the physicist, Dr Stefan Frauendorf, was last seen by his Copenhagen colleagues in December 1984, when he returned home to his professorship at the University of Rossendorf.

No-one here had heard from Dr Frauendorf again, Mr Hansen said.

His colleagues at the institute first learned of the East German scientist's arrest and trial at the beginning of this year, POLITIKEN reported.

Dr Frauendorf, whose stay in Denmark was by formal agreement with the East German Academy of Sciences, had been associated with the Niels Bohr Institute for about 15 years, Mr Hansen told the paper.

AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ARRIVES FOR TALKS

LD032031 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1917 GMT 3 Nov 85

[Excerpt] Berlin 3 Nov (ADN) -- Austria's Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz arrived today in Berlin on an official visit to the GDR at the invitation of GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, who gave the guest and his entourage a cordial welcome at Schoenefeld Airport.

STOPH BIDS FAREWELL TO SYRIA'S AL-KASM

LD011237 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1139 GMT 1 Oct 85

[Text] Berlin, 1 Nov (ADN) -- The chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Syrian Arab Republic, Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm, concluded his 4-day official visit to the GDR today at noon.

At Berlin-Schoenefeld Airport, he was bidden a warm farewell by the chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph. A military ceremony was held in honor of the Syrian prime minister.

DOHLUS CONFERS WITH VISITING BCP DELEGATION

DW030745 East Berlin Television Service in German 1830 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Horst Dohlus, member of the Politburo and SED secretary, exchanged views in Berlin with a delegation of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the conclusion of their stay in the GDR. The guest acquainted themselves with the SED's leadership activities in enterprises and state and cooperative establishments.

FURTHER REPORTAGE ON KADAR'S VISIT TO U.K.

More on Talks with Thatcher

LD011126 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0400 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Ivan Lipovecz on 31 October speeches at dinner given by Margaret Thatcher, UK prime minister, for Janos Kadar, MSZMP first secretary in London -- Thatcher's speech within quotation marks in English with superimposed Hungarian translation, translated from Hungarian -- Kadar speech within quotation marks in own voice recorded]

[Excerpts] First of all here is our report from London. Janos Kadar continues his talks today [1 Nov] in Britain. Our special correspondent Ivan Lipovecz reports on the toasts that were delivered at last night's festive dinner:

The British prime minister said the following:

"Our talks here today [31 Oct] like those in Budapest last year have brought home to me the many common ideas we share, with regard to peace, prosperity, and security. The roads leading to our objectives may be different; perhaps we do not profess identical views on social justice. On the other hand, it is right and proper that we should discuss those issues which divide us. I am greatly encouraged by the fact that we have been able to do this and are able to do so in the (?tones of) the shared responsibility we feel for the future of the world. We, just as all Europeans, have fully committed ourselves to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. We value highly the fact that Hungary, by holding the Budapest Cultural Forum, is contributing to the Helsinki process.

"Britain is resolutely seeking ways to improve East-West relations. At the same time it seeks the path that leads to the improvement of relations between the countries of the two big alliance systems. Britain is a member of one and Hungary of the other alliance. We are both faithful and will remain faithful to our allies. We both profess the view that contacts between European countries, just as much as in British-Hungarian respects, in itself play a useful role and promote the creation of trust between East and West."

[Lipovecz] This is how Janos Kadar replied to Mrs Thatcher's words:

"It is a well-known fact that the people of the Hungarian People's Republic and the United Kingdom are treading on different paths of social progress. Our countries belong to different alliance systems. Because of this our views differ in the assessment of important international issues. But I consider it significant that we also have points which coincide. We have a shared commitment to developing mutually advantageous bilateral relations. There was agreement between us also in that, in the interest of our peoples, we must do everything possible to ease tensions, and to promote peace.

"On the part of the Hungarian state leadership, we consider armament to be greatest danger threatening mankind. Together with our allies, the other Warsaw Pact countries, we consider the curbing of this to be the most urgent task. Our endeavor is directed toward insuring that the balance of power, mutual security, should be realized at the lowest possible level of armaments. We welcome the forthcoming summit meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States.

We hope that the meeting will really be the start of substantive discussions and, in the longer term, will lay the foundation for the improvement of the international situation. We consider important all the international consultations which serve the reduction in the level of military confrontation, the strengthening of security and trust, the development of relations between states of different social systems, and the cause of understanding between the peoples.

These are the objectives which direct us at the Stockholm Conference at the Vienna talks, at the meetings of the Helsinki process, including the European Cultural Forum which is currently underway in Budapest.

Foreign Ministers Confer

LD021133 Budapest MTI in English 1015 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] London, November 1 (MTI) -- Sir Geoffrey Howe, secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, gave a luncheon in honour of Janos Kadar and his party Friday midday.

In the course of the morning, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi, who is accompanying Janos Kadar, had a 45 minute discussion.

The meeting was the continuation of the talks which had begun the day before between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Janos Kadar, with the inclusion of the two foreign ministers, on East-West relations, the prospects of arms limitation and bilateral relations, including economic and trade issues. The British party termed the discussion useful.

Other members of Janos Kadar's party also held talks with their British partners. State Secretary Rezso Banyasz, president of the Information Office of the Council of Ministers, had talks with Bernhard Ingham, head of the prime minister's information office, and Christopher Meyer, head of the Press Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Tibor Melega, deputy foreign trade minister, called on John Cassel, general director of the National Economic Development Council, and Minister of State Paul Channon of the Department of Trade and Industry.

Meeting With Industrialists

LD021612 Budapest MTI in English 1116 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] London, November 1 (MTI) -- Janos Kadar visited the Confederation of British Industrialists in the afternoon. He was welcomed by President Sir Ronald Mcintosh and members of the presidium. By way of introduction the HSWP general secretary gave a brief on Hungarian economic life, its targets and its position in the international division of labour.

Hungary had never sought for isolation but for the possibilities of active participation in the international division of labour, he stressed. The extension of the economic relations of countries of diverging social systems which belong to different alliance systems, serves both parties' interest and it contributes not only to economic development but also to the cause of detente.

[Word indistinct] the main characteristic features of Hungarian economy, Janos Kadar spoke about the increased independence of enterprises and the new methods of economic management.

On British-Hungarian economic relations he emphasized that the two countries' trade had developed at a great pace over the past years. The extension of cooperation and joint actions on third market would serve the furtherance of cooperation. There are favourable opportunities for this particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, energetics and the production of transport vehicles.

Janos Kadar stressed that the political conditions of the further development of economic relations were existing. The Hungarian People's Republic continues to be a reliable partner in international cooperation.

Minister of State Paul Channon of the Department of Trade and Industry, also addressed the meeting. He also stressed his government wish to further cooperation.

Then in the course of an informal discussion, Janos Kadar answered questions of British businessmen on the current targets of the Hungarian economic policy and business opportunities in Hungary.

Kadar Press Conference

LD012108 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Report on press conference given by MSZMP First Secretary Janos Kadar on 1 Nov in Hyde Park Hotel, London; Kadar in Hungarian with interpreter supplying English translation -- recorded]

[Text] [Begin Kadar recording] I greet you, the representatives of the press, a force very important in shaping public opinion. You are aware that I have come here to pay a political visit which is a return visit in response to the visit paid by the prime minister of Great Britain to Hungary last year.

The discussions that have taken place in the course of the present visit, just as the one in Budapest last year, took place in a good atmosphere. Many differences had to be taken into account -- the different social systems of the two countries, their adherence to different alliance systems, and some other factors.

Against that background I can say that we have had good talks. Why? Because there are common meeting points in the positions of the representatives of the two governments. We emphasized with great stress what is quite obvious, that one of these common points is the bilateral relations between the two countries. It is a fact that both sides, both Hungary and Great Britain, are for the development of these bilateral relations, including the diplomatic, and political relations; the meeting of high-level state leaders; economic relations; cultural relations; and other relations that lead to increased contacts between the two peoples. And separately, and here I would like to emphasize this, press relations, including mutual visits by journalists to each other's countries, and their reporting about the other country -- because if we are talking about a better understanding of each other, this is part and parcel of the process.

The area of economic relations is an important part of our overall relationship. I have just come from the Confederation of British Industry, where I emphasized with approval that although the volume of trade between the two countries is not all that significant; nevertheless, over the past 2 years, trade increased by 45 percent.

And in the course of that meeting we also agreed that economic relations between the two countries should be further developed on the basis of mutual advantages and benefits.

And this mutual interest is there in many different ways, even in the sense that there are no ideological problems in that area. In this area, in the fields of economics and business, in the strictest sense of the word, only those things can materialize and come about which correspond to our mutual interests.

At the same time, I emphasized that we are not talking only about economic relations as such, but that when we come to the economic relations between different countries, between countries of different social systems, then the development of these economic relations become active elements for the improvement of a more peaceful world and of international relations.

The other great area, the other issue on which there has been agreement, was the necessity to take steps to realize a more relaxed, improved, and more peaceful, international situation. I think it cannot be disputed that this is in the interest of both countries. And I believe that if we stopped passersby in the street in both countries, together with you, and asked them, here in London or in Budapest, these passersby would unanimously say that their desire was to prosper by the toils of their labor and to live in peace. The prime minister and I agreed that this was in the best interest of both our people.

And of course, because we are talking about a respected representative of a NATO country, and a representative of a socialist country sitting on the other side of the table, we did not delve into the causes of tensions because that would have immediately put an end to our agreement. The situation is dangerous. No matter whether we are talking about the representative of a large, medium-size, or small country, it is the duty of the leaders to work for detente and peace.

It appears to me that as far as the coming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting is concerned, there is a common hope that some sort of positive agreement will be reached. It is hoped that this meeting will lead to some agreement and, that it will have an effect that later on this event [words indistinct].

As far as the opinion of the Hungarian People's Republic is concerned, it is unnecessary in my opinion to repeat it here, because we held a consultation with our allies in Sofia. We Hungarians took part in the wording of that communique, and not out of courtesy, but out of deep conviction, we put our opinions into writing.

We proclaim in unison with our allies that there is a balance of power between the two opposing power alliances, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The preservation of this balance is essential. And we proclaim in unison with our allies that a security fulfilling the common interests of the protagonists which satisfies both parties must be created at a lower level of armaments. [sentence as heard] I must express my thanks to the organizers here for the entire program of the visit, because even in the little time that was available, they have tried to acquaint me with various aspects of life here and for me, visiting London and Great Britain for the first time, it was very interesting to be able to verify things which I have known about since my early youth, that they really exist and are there. It seemed as if I was not seeing them for the first time. One really comes across here a special combination of the old and the new. Among other things, my escort, when showing me around the parliament building, told me about such old matters when I told him that it appeared that there were fewer seats than actual MP's. Originally, it was not built to have all the MP's sitting here; rather, this served the purpose of debate, so that the debate would be held in here and not outside.

So, I thought that although the gentleman who said that was probably a member of the Conservative Party and someone who cultivates traditions, I said that I, as a communist, as (the representative) of a socialist country, should listen to this, because we should also learn to debate better inside the hall, so that we do not have to debate outside the hall. [sentence as heard]

Of course, I was shown the place in the library where Marx worked, where he carried out his scientific research, and it immediately occurred to me that Karl Marx had this idea of socialism, and how much work he gave us. [as received]. [End recording]

Following Janos Kadar's opening words, the journalists asked questions. Would Hungary revive the negotiations that had once begun with the EEC, even if the negotiations between the EEC and CEMA failed to bring results?

[Begin Kadar recording] When these negotiations broke off, this was not in connection with the negotiations that were in progress between the EEC and the CEMA. We welcome and support and are in fact participants in the CEMA message that there is a need for some sort of possible cooperation agreement between the CEMA and the EEC. This, we hope, will come about and it will help economic relations between the two parts of Europe. Now, I think that this would not exclude but usefully supplement certain agreements between individual countries and the EEC.

You used the expression that the EEC believes that it plays a considerable role in our thoughts -- well, more than that is involved. Certain countries of the EEC play a considerable part not only in our thoughts but in real life, in our economic relations. We suspended these negotiations because we had been unable to make any progress on what we had asked for; namely, that the countries of the EEC should provide us with all those rights to which Hungary was entitled as a member of GATT. For, at least at this time, these rights have not been secured. Certain limitations are employed against us which should not be, certain states have introduced customs duties against us which are discriminative, and the same holds true in other respects. If we were to receive suitable proposals from the EEC countries, the negotiations would continue. [end recording]

Another British reporter asked whether Janos Kadar would accept an invitation from President Reagan to visit the United States.

[Begin Kadar recording] In principle, I cannot raise any objections to this, since I have noticed that certain bourgeois countries have recognized that I am the secretary of the party, and yet want to negotiate with me within the framework of interstate relations. This is something that I have had to resign myself to, because they say that I am a part of the Hungarian leadership and that I have a certain role. I try to point out that in that case they should at least put there on paper that I am a member of the Presidential Council. They generally do so but they do not pay any attention to it. Yesterday, for example, when the British prime minister greeted me -- I was taken aback for a moment -- in my capacity of general secretary of the party, she said I was the First secretary of the party. (?The first such) to enter this house.

My answer is that we would treat it as a question in line with the customary interstate practice, if an invitation of that sort would arrive, (?I and) the relevant people would state their positions and send their reply and, as they usually put it, at a time which is mutually suitable for the sides. [end recording]

The next question concerned the modifying of the electoral law in Hungary. The journalist asked what effect the changes in the electoral system have had on the development of democracy and what the characteristics of Hungarian democracy are, and to what extent democracy in Hungary and Britain have similar or different features.

[Begin Kadar recording] As regards the modifying of the electoral law in Hungary and, in line with this, the conduct of the elections this year, the experiences are positive. The fact that multiple candidacy is compulsory in every consistency made the elections more lively. This is what I can say in answer to this question.

As for your other question, I cannot give a substantive answer because if someone were to take a look at my agenda, where there is hardly enough free time to wash my hands, he would understand that I have not been able to carry out studies of the democratic solutions realized in Great Britain. However, I can state in general that in all spheres and in all respects, we do not reject those elements that have developed in the course of history, and that have been proved correct but, rather, we are trying to put them in practice. [End recording]

Discusses Ties With Israel

LD021240 Budapest MTI in English 1100 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Excerpts] London, November 1 (MTI) -- Janos Kadar stressed the reciprocal desire for the development of Hungarian-British relations and the mutual interests in easing international tension at a press-conference given in London Friday evening.

Answering a question regarding Israel, Janos Kadar stressed that there was no principle blocking the resumption of the Hungarian-Israeli diplomatic relations and the question may be considered, if Israel shows an attitude compatible with the accepted norms of international affairs. In other words, if the reasons that in the past led to the severement of relations are removed.

Arrives in Budapest

LD022201 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] Janos Kadar has arrived home from Great Britain. Our correspondent, Gabor Domovari, reports from Ferihegy Airport:

The plane carrying Janos Kadar, first secretary of the MSZMP and member of the Presidential Council, arrived from his official visit to Great Britain at the invitation of the British Government, a few minutes before 1915 GMT at Ferihegy Airport.

Janos Kadar was accompanied by Peter Varkonyi, minister of foreign affairs and member of the Central Committee; State Secretary Rezsoe Banyasz, chairman of the Government Information Office; Laszlo Karvalics, deputy head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee; Laszlo Kovacs, deputy head of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee; and Tibor Melega, deputy minister of foreign trade.

Present at Ferihegy Airport to receive Janos Kadar were Karoly Nemeth, deputy general secretary of the MSZMP; Deputy Premier Laszlo Marothy; members of the Politburo; Rezsoe Trautmann, deputy president of the Presidential Council; Geza Kotai, head of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee; Janos Kamara, minister of internal affairs; members of the Central Committee; Lajos Urban, minister of transport; and State Secretary Gyula Horn, member of the Central Committee. The British charge d'affaires ad interim was also present.

REACTION TO REAGAN'S RESPONSE TO USSR INITIATIVE

Proposals Lack New Approach

LD031413 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1105 GMT 4 Nov 85

[Program presented by Boniecka and Dziemidowicz]

[Text] [Boniecka] From hour to hour agencies supply further details of Ronald Reagan's proposal, as well as issues connected with the preparations for the summit. In principle the entire text of Reagan's interview will be published today, simultaneously with the publication of the text by the Soviet press. But, we already know the details of Reagan's proposal.

First, let me make a general remark: Perhaps we all agree, and this has been written about by the most serious U.S. commentators, that the President of the United States found himself in a defensive position in respect to his approach to the Geneva disarmament talks. This is true because proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Paris, which have been widely commented on, have put the United States in the position of a power that in essence has proposed nothing new.

I also presume that United States allies at the United Nations General Assembly session in New York clearly pressured Reagan: They expect problems of armaments control and disarmament to be essential. The administration had to propose some approach.

[Dziemidowicz] So it proposed; but this approach, as you said yourself, is nothing new, and it was assessed as such in Moscow.

[Boniecka] Reagan has reverted to the old idea of seeing any reduction of nuclear forces as applying to missiles fired from the ground; thus applying to arsenals which are largest in the Soviet Union due to the fact that it is a continental power. His general statement, declaring he proposes a very substantial reduction of nuclear forces, is of such a general nature that it clearly suggests that it concerns the reduction of missiles fired from the ground. At the same time, in the same breath, Reagan immediately announced that the United States will not give up the development of the so-called space defense program: Thus, at the same time it looks as if he rejected Gorbachev's proposal of a 50 percent reduction in long-range missiles on the condition that all research on the militarization of space be given up.

[Dziemidowicz] Let us recall that the Soviet Union maintains that if a reduction is to be made -- and according to Moscow it is a necessary step -- then it has to be made in all fields, starting with space armaments, long-range missiles, and Eurorockets, in other words in those fields being discussed in Geneva.

[Boniecka] Yes, undoubtedly, Soviet proposals were very concise, and offered an exit that states that if there are no attempts at the militarization of space then one can discuss the 50 percent redcution in strategic arms. Whereas the United States, by rejecting any discussion on the "star wars" program and demanding that the Soviet side make a very substantial reduction in its basic nuclear forces which constitute the largest forces of the Soviet Union, simply made proposals which aim at a reduction to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

Let us recall that the United States spoke frequently, in general terms, about the so-called zero option, which is a complete reduction of nuclear forces, at the same time assuming that this reduction would apply to arsenals in which the United States is relatively weak, and the Soviet Union best developed.

[Dziemidowicz] On reading the U.S. proposals, and considering Washington's approach to disarmament issues, one is under the impression that Washington does not quite know how to prepare an answer to Soviet initiatives, to the simple peace offensive made by Mikhail Gorbachev. Its tone, and scope seemed to surprise the White House and took the wind from its sails.

[Boniecka] This is being pointed out by all commentators; when one reads U.S. proposals they find, in fact, they do not propose any new approach to the issue. They state: We will continue to conduct research into the Strategic Defense Initiative, and we expect the Soviet side to accept our conditions for an arms reduction. Obviously this proposal has been calculated mainly to calm down their West European allies, and in part, their own public opinion. You will agree that recently the West European press and various statements made by politicians, mainly from opposition parties, indicate that their allies are very deeply concerned that the United States does not reply to the Soviet Union's initiative, which has been assessed as a radical proposal for arms reduction and the prevention of the militarization of space.

Soviet proposals have been described as radical and new, and the first reaction of Western agencies to the American proposal said that unfortunately the President of the United States proposed nothing new. This, in essence, is a defense for the benefit of public opinion, to show that Americans have some cards in their hands. In fact they hold few cards.

TASS Response Cited

LD011946 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Journalists from the TASS Agency, the APN press agency and the newspapers PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have conducted an interview with President Ronald Reagan in the White House.

Commenting on President Reagan's disarmament proposals, the TASS agency states that, in assessing their essential aspects, the majority of Western observers are coming to the conclusion that they are based on the same old American principles that have not only not brought about any progress so far in the Geneva negotiations, but have taken them down a dead end street.

Attention is drawn, among other things, to the fact that Ronald Reagan's proposals are, in effect, old American proposals -- just somewhat modified and presented in a new package, comments the TASS agency.

REAGAN'S ADVICE TO ACTIVISTS TERMED INTERFERENCE

LD012013 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 2138 GMT 30 Oct 85

[Text] President Reagan has allowed himself to further interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. This time, he has done so responding to a question by a journalist from READER'S DIGEST: Mr President, if you were to give the Poles some advice, what would you say to Lech Walesa and to activists of Solidarity or the church who are opposed to the communist regime? He stated: I would have to reply to them, continue what you are doing at present. Continue your brave struggle for freedom, demand reforms as well as basic human, religious, and economic rights. No doubt these were the same pieces of advice he gave to the head of the so-called Brussels Solidarity Bureau, Milewski, whom he recently received at the White House, and who is prepared to collaborate with everyone, even West German revanchists. When the President speaks, his special act. [sentence as received] Will they find collaborators? History has shown that collaborationism is alien to the Polish nation. So who is President Reagan counting on?

CONTINUED AFL-CIO PRESSURE TERMED 'CAMOUFLAGE'

LD012337 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Commentary by Marek Baranskij]

[Text] We have already reported that Jerzy Milewski, head of the so-called Solidarity coordinating bureau in Brussels, has been a guest of the White House and the American AFL-CIO trade union. During the last AFL-CIO congress, a resolution was adopted calling for a continuation of remaining American economic sanctions against the PPR, and also for applying further economic and diplomatic pressure on PPR authorities. Here is Marek Boranski:

American trade union chiefs once again presented, without camouflage, their attitude toward Poland. Is it indeed without camouflage? Restrictions not only upset us, but also upset a considerable number of Poles living in America. Their representatives differ considerably in their political beliefs. There are those Poles in America who never accepted socialism in Poland, and never hid their animosity towards our government; but even they do not understand American behavior towards Poland. Similarly, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States is openly against the restrictions, and for the normalization of Polish-American relations.

Because of these people, because of public opinion, including American opinions, camouflage was necessary in order to invent the pretext that the AFL-CIO resolution is the result of requests from Poland. Because no Pole wished to be a coauthor of the idea, no one wished to cooperate in this. Thus, Milewski has become useful because of his support for economic discrimination against Poland. He wants to be a collaborator. This term applies to those persons who cooperate to the detriment of their country and their compatriots of their own free will and for their own benefit. The definition of collaborator has its origins in World War II, when there were no Poles among Petains and Quislings, let alone Polish divisions organized like fascist formations in France, the Netherlands, or Norway.

Mikewski has only now been found, and lamentably like all collaborators, he is full of slogans about human rights, and he humbly awaits approval from those who keep tens of thousands of political prisoners in their own state, according to the director of the national union of struggle against racial and political repression. That state brought a priest who defends poor and unfortunate people to court, and also their own trade union activists who demand respect for workers rights.

In exchange for a pat on the back, he provides an alibi for those who dream of treating Poland as an instrument [ci ktorym marzy sie instrumentalne traktowanie polski].

JARUZELSKI SAYS GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN 6 NOV

LD022048 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1900 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] The Council of Ministers has held its last meeting before the Sejm appoints a new government. The chairman of the Council of Ministers, Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski took the floor. He said that the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic of the ninth term was chosen in the 13 October elections. In accordance with the Constitution, the Sejm appoints and recalls the government. In order to enable the newly-elected Sejm to appoint a government, and observing the political custom formed in practice, the Council of Ministers should tender its resignation.

He continued by saying that I would like, therefore, to announce the Government's resignation at the [6 November] first session of the Sejm of the ninth term.

The Council of Ministers then authorized the premier to tender the government's resignation to the Sejm. Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski then expressed thanks to the deputy premiers, ministers, heads of central offices and voivodas, and all administrative employees for their conscientious and fruitful work carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions of the period which has elapsed.

DETAINED STUDENT DIES OF FRACTURED SKULL

AU031515 Paris AFP in English 0210 GMT 3 Nov 85

[Excerpts] Warsaw, Nov 3 (AFP) -- A 19-year-old Polish student who suffered a fractured skull after being arrested by police on October 19 died Saturday after two weeks in a coma, his family said.

Martin Antonowicz, who was in his first year at the chemistry faculty of Gdansk University, was stopped with two friends by police in the northern town of Olsztyn as they made their way home from a party on October 19. The two friends were released after an identity check, but Martin Antonowicz was taken off in a police van. He was later found unconscious on the street beside the police van which took him away and surrounded by several other police vehicles. He was taken to Olsztyn hospital emergency unit, where the doctor on duty, who happened to be his mother Krystyna, found a wound on the back of his head. He was then taken to the Gdansk Academy of Medicine for a series of X-rays. He never recovered consciousness.

According to police, when they stopped Martin Antonowicz, he was drunk and was detained to allow him time to sober up. They said that inside the van, he threw himself at the lone policeman guarding him and gripped his throat. He then wrenched open the van door and jumped out onto the road, where he slipped and fell, the police said. However, the student's two friends denied he was drunk. They and other witnesses said the nine people at the party had drunk only 1.5 liters of vodka (three pints) among them.

Meanwhile, his family has filed an official complaint claiming the young man was beaten up. His mother told western journalists over the telephone: "Everyone knows why my son died. He died from a fractured skull. I would rather not talk about it. I've nothing more to say other than that he is dead. He was in a coma for 14 days and never recovered consciousness. His funeral will be next Wednesday."

Independent sources said the town of Olsztyn was "tense". Nearly 300 inhabitants, including several doctors, have sent a petition to parliament and to the office of the chief magistrate, expressing "deep indignation" and calling on the authorities to "elucidate" the matter.

The death was announced from the pulpit in several Olsztyn churches while police patrols were reinforced in the streets and cars not bearing local number plates were systematically stopped.

The regional committee of the ruling workers' party met to consider measures to "placate ill-feeling".

Walesa 'Overwhelmed'

AU022104 Paris AFP in English 2059 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Excerpts] Warsaw, Nov 2 (AFP) -- In a first reaction to Mr Antonowicz' death, Lech Walesa, head of the outlawed trade union Solidarity, said he was "overwhelmed."

Speaking from his apartment in Gdansk, Mr Walesa described it as a "crime", and said it had happened, "once again in unexplained circumstances, with the participation of an Interior Ministry official." It was understood to be a reference to the death last year of Grzegorz Przemyk, a 19-year-old high-school student, whose parents say was beaten to death in a Warsaw police station. Two police officers who had been linked with his death were declared innocent of any involvement.

"I fear, in the light of recent experience, that it will be very difficult to find out who is guilty" for Mr Antonowicz' alleged murder, Mr Walesa said.

POLITICAL PRISONERS SAID TO JOIN HUNGER STRIKE

HK020514 Hong Kong AFP in English 0430 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Text] Warsaw, Nov (AFP) -- Six political prisoners detained at Leczyca, central Poland, have joined a hunger strike by their colleague Jozef Sreniowski, a leader of the democratic opposition, Jacek Kuron, said Friday. Mr Sreniowski, a former member of the Social Self-Defence Committee KOR, has been on hunger strike since September 24. The hunger strikers are demanding that a doctor named by Polish Archbishop Jozef Glemp should be allowed to visit the prison and examine them. Mr Kuron also said that two other political prisoners, Marek Lucarz and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, had been moved from Leczyca to a hospital at Lodz, about 50 kilometres (30 miles) away. He did not know why they were in hospital.

Independent sources say the nine political prisoners were regularly mistreated by their guards. On October 1 they were all taken from their cells and beaten, the sources said. Four either had their legs and sex organs twisted, or had fingers pushed into their eyes, while two others were taken to hospital for treatment, according to the sources. Two days after the incident Mr Frasyniuk, who was suffering pain in his ribs, was sentenced to 14 days' solitary confinement and a three-month ban on visits and letters, the sources said.

UNOFFICIAL 'POLITICAL PRISONER WEEK' OPENS

AU031805 Paris AFP in English 1801 GMT 3 Nov 85

[Text] Warsaw, Nov 3 (AFP) -- Poland's unofficially-organised "Political Prisoner Week" opened today with a petition to the authorities signed by Lech Walesa and more than 70 other prominent Poles, and special masses in Polish churches. The number of political prisoners held in Poland stood last October 22 at 363, of whom 81 are serving prison sentences. The petition called for the freeing of all political prisoners and measures to enable them to lead a normal life once again. Many released political prisoners have been refused their old jobs back and are either out of work or have been shifted to other areas of employment.

Besides Mr Walesa, leader of the banned Solidarity union, the 77 signatories included filmaker Andrzej Wajda, author Tadeusz Konwicki, Father Henryk Jankowski, chaplain at the Gdansk shipyards, veteran Marxist economist Edward Lipinski, former University of Warsaw Rector Henryk Samsonowicz, the former head of the Polish Journalists' Association, Roman Bratkowski, and physician Marek Edelman, one of the last surviving leaders of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1943. The petition called as well for the concept of political prisoner to be given legal status in Poland, freedom of opinion, toleration, democracy, and the abolition of "numerous repressive laws." Addressing all governments that signed the Helsinki declaration, the petition said that "peace can be lasting only if human rights are respected in every country."

In Gdansk, one of a number of cities where special masses were celebrated for political prisoners, Father Hankowski delivered a homily in which he warned that "if the government persists in widening the gap that separates the party and the people, it can only lead to tragedy.

During "Political Prisoner Week" symposiums and masses are being organised in churches and collections taken in factories to aid the families of persons detained for their political views.

URBAN RESPONDS TO ATTEMPTS AT 'HOUSING MIRACLE'

LD301506 Warsaw PAP in English 1402 GMT 30 Oct 85

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 30 -- Aleksander Paszynski is the author of a programmatic article "Road to Apartment", published by TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY Catholic weekly No 43, Jan Rem [Jerzy Urban's pen name] says in his most recent column. It is due to the spirit of the weekly that even the old rationalist has been leaning towards magic, Rem opined.

The essence of Paszynski's concept is that the state give the money allocated for new apartments not to housing cooperatives, building enterprises, etc., but to citizens. Everybody who needs a flat should receive a credit so that he may solve his own housing problem basing upon that credit and his own financial resources.

It is only in isolation from economic realities and in disregard of the whole national economy and of actual social wishes, and only on paper, that Aleksander Paszynski can quickly double the number of completed apartments and claim this to be attainable through a change in the credit system alone. Indeed, a good change in the credit system could in itself dynamize the housing sector, but on a much more modest scale than suggested by Paszynaki.

One can hardly resist the suspicion that declarations of innovative concepts, conveniently abstracting from the fundamental calculation the housing construction is entangled with, aim at some other supreme goal than that of seeking solutions to the housing problem. Since Paszynski's article creates a suggestion that everybody in Poland would soon have a convenient lodging were it not for the senseless traditionalism and dogmatism of the country's economic leadership, the latter cramping this and other fields of life within a corset hampering development.

It will just suffice to obey the independent concept-makers to help work a housing miracle in Poland, it would seem. After all it is the serious British daily THE TIMES that announces to Britain and the world, through its correspondent P. Boyes, that the parish priest of St. Stanislaus Church in the Warsaw district of Zoliborz is compiling a list of miracles taking place in his church, where for example a boy ceased walking on crutches -- THE TIMES assures.

What could be easier than adding the housing problem to the list of postulated miracles just a little bit rationalized by credits as the source of magical qualities.

BRIEFS

REFINERY FIGURES ISSUED -- During the last 10 years the Gdansk refinery plant treated 19.8 million metric tons of crude oil. This was mainly Romashkino oil sent through the Friendship pipeline from the Soviet Union. It is envisaged that the refinery will treat its 20 millionth metric ton of crude oil in the first half of November. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0200 GMT 2 Nov 85 LD]

DIE WELT ALLEGATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS REJECTED

AU011634 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1608 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 1/11/1985 -- In its October 30 issue, the newspaper DIE WELT of the Federal Republic of Germany, ran an article, accompanied by a map, allegedly showing that foreign bases with chemical weapons were located in Romania's territory. From the very beginning, it should be stressed that such a statement runs counter to the truth and relies on no real ground. The fact has been well known for a long time -- and the newspaper DIE WELT should have known it, as an elementary duty -- that no foreign military base -- neither chemical nor of any other kind -- is located in Romania's territory.

Like insinuations, such as that printed in DIE WELT, which distort the principled policy promoted by Romania, are in flagrant contradiction with the norms of professional ethics, with the need to correctly inform the public opinion, with the cause of disarmament and detente in Europe and in the world.

On this occasion too, we reiterate the consistent position of Romania that states and works resolutely for the dismantlement of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other states. Furthermore, we place emphasis on Romania's stance on the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of palpable measures of disarmament, in the field of chemical weapons included; our country is for their elimination.

Romania, that firmly states [as received] for disarmament, considers that agreements should be reached in such highly important areas as the cessation of the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe and in the world, the withdrawal and scrapping of the ones in place, the substantial reduction of military budgets, of troops and weapons, the prevention of the expansion of the arms race to the outer space, the prohibition of the production and improvement of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons.

BOOK ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT PUBLISHED

AU312051 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1900 GMT 31 Oct 85

["From Arms Control to Disarmament" -- AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 31/10/1985 -- Under the above title, Bucharest's political publishing house put out a work of minute analysis of both the concrete political measures and theoretical developments that have prevailed in the approaches to disarmament-related questions over the last forty years. The work, authored by Niclae Ecobescu and Vasile Secares, unravels the deep-lying causes of the situation mnkind is placed in 1985, when it faces the mounting threat of total annihilation by a nuclear conflict, in spite of all the people's yearning for peace and security. To underscore this serious discrepancy, the authors resort to statistics outlining the scope the arms has gained at present, as well as the substantive connection between nuclear arsenals build-ups, the development of strategic ideas and theories that took into account the possiblities of using the new means of destruction and the "arms control" theory.

The road to disarmament, the authors argue, presupposes a manysided, complex definition of the arming phenomenon itself, its re-evaluation and the re-assessment of the role played by the military factor in the creation of stable, peaceful inter-state relations accordingly.

The authors advocate the discarding of a whole conceptual ballast, abounding in vague notions that evade clear definitions, such as "stability," "balance," "parity," i.e. the very goal of political and military actions must be reformulated, with stress laid on the need for an effective reduction, "as the eventual target is a full destruction of the material means of force, in the conditions of achieving general and total disarmament," they point out.

The authors highlight the remarkable contribution made by the proposals Romania set forth in this area, the originality and the foremost contribution of President Nicolae Ceausescu's thinking. A new-type principled approach to international security problems; setting a rational hierarchy of the targets that are to be attained, particularly as concerns an end to the arms race; effective disarmament -- nuclear disarmament in the first place; the abolishment of the role of force in inter-state relations, and its substitution by the universally-acknowledged norms of international law; the criticism and effective overcoming of inter-state relations being laid on the "logic" of military blocs and of the "equilibrium of terror"; the full establishment and unswerving observance of the principle of non-recourse to force as a premise to eliminating armed conflicts from international life; an effective enhancement of the role played by the United Nations institutional mechanisms in the resolution of disarmament and related questions are only a few of the keynotes contained in the documents Romania tabled at international negotiating forums. Outlining the breadth of scope of the specific proposals advanced by Romania and integrating them into a coherent programme of action, the authors prove the superiority of an original approach, known and appreciated worldwide as "Romania's position" on disarmament.

INTENSIVE ACTIVITY IN COAL INDUSTRY REPORTED

AU312053 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1852 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 31/1o/1985 -- Coal production has increased with every passing month. Planned physical production has been substantially topped by the collectivities of the mining combine of Ploiesti, the mining combine in the Jiu valley, the mining enterprises at Vioevoizi and Sarmasag and many others. Miners on the Jiu valley turned out a record production -- 287,000 tons in only one month. The planned production of coal for coke and semicoke has been topped by 28.000 tons. This mining basin delivered 177.000 tons of pit coal above the level of production last year. The Jiu valley supplies almost 50 percent of the metallurgical coal needed. Another mining basin, that at Motru, which holds a 30-per cent share in the national production of fuel coal, has supplied the economy this year with more than 13 million tons of lignite. The mining basin of Rovinari has registered large coal outputs as its monthly extractions stand at roughly 1.5 million tons. The miners and excavator operators there reported that physical production had been topped. They are aided by more than 2,500 workers come from other sectors who make a substantial contribution to equipment maintenance and repair. Furthermore, steps have been taken for the integral mechanization of extraction operations performed in coal pits. Technological lines were mounted in open-cast mines equipped with bucket-carrying rotor excavators, conveyor belts, large-capacity transport means and special waste-dumping machines. Moreover, extensive actions were carried out in underground to equip units with mechanized outfits.

FESTIVE MEETINGS MARK OCTOBER REVOLUTION

AU312046 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1909 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 31/10/1985 -- Festive meetings were held in Bucharest and the municipality of Pitesti to mark the 68th anniversary of the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution.

Attending were representatives of the local party and state bodies, mass and public organizations, numerous working people. Members of the Soviet Union's embassy in Bucharest were present.

AGEPRES CARRIES LETTERS ON IULIA CASE

AU312110 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1544 GMT 31 Oct 85

["The Truth in Iulia Jercan's 'Case'" -- AGERPRES Headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 31/10/1985 -- The Romanian news agency AGERPRES has received from Ion Jercan, father of Iulia Jercan -- around whom French political circles and publications built a so-called human rights case following the justified refusal of the family to agree to her marriage to Pierre Blondeau -- his letter to France's ambassador in Bucharest demanding an end to the interference in the life of his daughter and family.

Puzzled that three weeks after he mailed his letter he still did not have an answer from the French ambassador in Bucharest, Ion Jercan asked the Romanian news agency AGERPRES to broadcast his protest in its foreign-language services and in that way to bring the tragedy of a family around which an atmosphere of scandal and agitation was artificially built to the knowledge of world public opinion.

At the same time, Ion Jercan asked that his letter to LE MONDE newspaper and another one to Pierre Blondeau be broadcast.

Letter to France's Ambassador in Bucharest:

Sir, I am writing to you on a strictly personal matter. I am the father of Iulia Jercan of Bucharest, 10 Ion Cretescu Street, the one who was misled into making a so-called file in view of her marriage to a French citizen.

I believe things would have long been clear to my daughter and she would have prcbably given up the idea of marriage, had it not been for certain confusing influences some of which I am sorry to say came from your embassy.

I do not understand why, for what purpose and by virtue of what attributes, your embassy and you yourself interfere in the private life of a Romanian citizen, of his daughter, without the family's consent.

Please instruct your staff to leave my daughter alone and tell the man who corrupted my daughter to concentrate on raising his two children nearly thirty years of age, all the more so as he himself is rather advanced in age. At his age I was close to retirement.

Solving my daughter's request to marry the French citizen is the exclusive competence of the Romanian state, of its bodies and, first of all, of our family. Not even I as a father can do it alone, so please stop interfering in my family matters.

I do not want my child to be humiliated in the streets and boulevards in France. Sincerely, Jercan Ion.

On October 29, the following letter was sent to Mr Andre Fontaine, director of LE MONDE Daily:

Dear sir, It is with indignation that I learnt of the statement of the French solidarity party -- that the newspaper you manage covered -- relative to the fact that my daughter Iulia Jercan would not get the Romanian authorities' approval to marry Pierre Blondeau.

The truth, sir, is that the family does not agree with this marriage to a 53 year-old man, the father of two children -- one aged 26, by one year my daughter's junior, and the other age 30.

As I told the French ambassador in Bucharest in a letter mailed to him three weeks ago which, unfortunately, he has not answered to this day, nobody has a right to interfere in the private life of my family and daughter. To solve the request for marriage of my daughter to Pierre Blondeau is first of all a problem that concerns my family, and it is only natural that the Romanian authorities take our will into consideration, observe our wish that Iulia Jercan stay with us who are close to her, and not go away from those who love her, to foreigners.

I am convinced that my daughter Iulia Jercan who was misled into compiling a file in view of marrying a French citizen 25 years older than herself would not have taken that thoughtless step and that everything would have long been clear to her and the idea of marriage given up, had it not been, as I wrote also to the French ambassador, for certain influences and the pressure put on her which confused her. Unfortunately, some of them came from France's ambassador in Bucharest himself.

Please, sir, understand the indignation of a father at the insistence and the scandalous publicity that this family case receives which, I stress it again, concerns ourselves.

In the name of justice, of truth, I ask you, sir, to agree to publishing this letter so that the truth may be known. I thank you in advance for your understanding and support, and I am sure that, when the French public opinion learns of my letter, the unjustified agitation around my daughter's case, deeply affecting our family, will end. Respectfully yours, Ion Jercan. P.S.: Enclosed is the French translation which I owe to a friend of mine.

Letter Sent to Mr Pierre Blondeau on October 29:

Mr Blondeau, as the father of Iulia Jercan, my only daughter, I have the right to approach you, who claim to be her fiance, and ask to end the atmosphere of scandal which you and France's embassy in Bucharest created around my family.

Had it been true what you incorrectly hold, namely that you would like to marry my daughter out of your allegedly "good and honest" intentions to "start a happy marriage" with a girl by 27 years your junior when you have two children each of which is older than Iulia, then it is hard to understand why you went to officials, newspapers, and various persons to make a sensational and scandalous affair out of this family case.

It would have been natural, honest and correct to have come from the very beginning to me, Mr Blondeau, in my capacity as a father, to our family and discuss the matters related to my daughter, the request to marry her.

I am convinced that also in France there is the age-old custom for the bridegroom to go to the parents of the girl with whom he intends to start an honest family based on fine sentiments and affection in order to discuss marriage openly and correctly. Why, then, did you not take this proper and honourable way and preferred instead a public scandal?

I must make a point, Mr. Blondeau, in case you did not know it before: The bridegroom's discussion with the daughter's parents and family before marriage is concluded is, in Romania, an over 2000 year old tradition, a custom that goes back to our Dacian ancestors.

So, I think that was the way you should have taken, had you been promoted by honest thoughts, had your heart been loving and really cared for my daughter Iulia. with whom you claim to want to start a family, which I did not and do not believe.

That is why I am very concerned about your false attitude as a so-called fiance of my daughter since, after all, it is against nature that a man closer to my age, the father of two children older than Iulia, to claim to have her as a wife and "mother" to your children by previous marriage who are older than my daughter.

These are good enough reasons to show me that the aims of your planned marriage to my only daughter are far from honest, that something altogether different lies behind. I do not wish to see my daughter humiliated, stroll the streets and frequent the bars of France that you, sir -- no offense meaning -- seem to be a frequent guest of although as a teacher your task would be to educate children.

Keeping a civilized tone with you, as much as this is possible, I ask you most firmly, in the name of the family, of the right I have as a father, to end these scandalous provocations.

Should you not give up these mean and scandalous, inhuman intentions, I would go before the public opinion and expose your machinations that humiliate the daugher I painstakingly brought her up, like every parent, only to find myself today hurt in my feelings as a father, as an honest Romanian who has always appreciated and praised the good relations between Romania and France, two Latin countries whose friendship is traditional. Jercan Ion, Bucharest, 10, Ion Cretescu Street 30 October 1985.

LCY DELEGATION HOLDS TALKS, MEETS DOBRESCU

AU011919 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1606 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 1/11/1985 -- Over October 28-November 1 a delegation of LCY activists including Krste Markovski, member of the Presidium of the CC of the League of Communists of Macedonia, and Martin Ivezaj, executive secretary of the CC of the League of Communists of Montenegro, paid a visit for experience exchange to Romania upon the invitation of the CC of the RCP.

The delegation conducted talks at the propaganda and press section of the CC of the RCP, at the headquarters of the Iasi County committee of the RCP and of party organizations of learning institutions and economic units in Bucharest and Iasi County.

At the end of their visit, the delegation were received by Miu Dobrescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP.

SHULTZ MOSCOW TRIP, GENEVA SUMMIT VIEWED

LD011931 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Milika Sundic commentary]

[Text] Considering the forthcoming Geneva meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, will the leaders of the two superpowers manage to reduce the gap between them, which is the basic problem of the relations between Moscow and Washington? Here is Milika Sundic:

The forthcoming visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to Moscow, where he will have talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and probably with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, will by all accounts be a decisive phase in the efforts of the two superpowers to see that their forthcoming summit in Geneva takes place in the most conciliatory atmosphere possible, out of which could come some sort of agreement on future U.S.-Soviet relations. Shultz is to establish with his hosts the agenda of the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting and to present to the Soviet leaders Reagan's reply to Gorbachev's proposal to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent and to ban the use of space for military purposes. This proposal, let us remember, was announced by Gorbachev during his recent visit to Paris.

At a press conference in the White House, President Reagan said that his answer to Gorbachev was serious and concrete and that it encompasses all three areas being negotiated in Geneva. Reagan says of Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal that it contains acceptable points. This means, in other words, that there could be, together with the U.S. counterproposal, an acceptable basis for dialogue in Geneva between the leaders of the two superpowers. Judging by what he said at the press conference, Reagan, like Gorbachev, advocates a radical reduction of strategic armaments, and, of particular significance, the elimination of the first-strike capability. Of course, as could also be expected, Reagan is standing by his so-called defense initiative, that is, "star wars," which is completely unacceptable to Moscow and which could negatively affect the course and outcome of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

While Gorbachev and Reagan were agreeing to meet in Geneva, an agreement in principle was also reached on the agenda. The two leaders will have talks on the reduction and limitation of nuclear missile armaments and the demilitarization of space, and on bilateral relations and regional probelms, such as the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central America. Whether other topics will be added to this will probably be decided during the course of Shultz's 2-day visit to Moscow. The two powers recently had several contacts devoted to the forthcoming Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, so one can assume that the talks which the U.S. Secretary of State will have with his Soviet colelague and with Mikhail Gorbachev will go well.

To be sure, although no miracles are expected from the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, the conviction is more and more gaining credence around the world that their meeting will nevertheless not be in vain. There is, namely, the possibility that the two leaders could come to an agreement on regular annual meetings at the highest level that could contribute to the reduction of existing distrust. It can justifiably be said that this destrust is the fundamental problem in Moscow-Washington relations. If Gorbachev and Reagan were to agree that the contradictions between the two sociopolitical systems should not be solved by military means, this would, without doubt, be a significant step forward which would open the door also for agreement on the most delicate problems, such as the problem of controlled disarmament and other issues.

In any case, for Reagan the meeting in Geneva will perhaps be the last opportunity to do something for the real improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and East-West relations as a whole. If it is missed, his name will always be connected with a time which the world will want to forget as soon as possible, because the possible breakdown in Geneva would seriously imperil the only foundations on which world peace can be based. This makes the responsibility of the two superpowers all the greater.

REAGAN PROPOSALS PRESENTED AT GENEVA TALKS

LD011826 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1708 GMT 1 Nov 85

[By Momcilo Blagojevic]

[Text] Geneva, Nov 1 (TANJUG) -- U.S. negotiators at the Geneva nuclear arms control talks today presented the Soviet side with President Reagan's counterproposals. Reagan was responding to an earlier Soviet proposal on a 50 percent cut in the two superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals.

This was confirmed by head of the U.S. team Max Kampelman at the opening of today's plenary session of the talks.

Soviet delegation head Viktor Karpov has stated that progress in the negotiations before the November Geneva summit depends on the Americans. To underline his reservation, he said that Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is still the main obstacle to deep cuts in nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side has repeatedly pointed out that the plan to reduce the two countries' nuclear arsenals by half -- as proposed by Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev during his meeting with President Mitterrand in Paris last October -- includes limiting or halting research in space-based weaponry.

The third round of negotiations, which started on September 19, was to have ended today. However, under instructions from President Reagan, the U.S. team yesterday sought an extension into next week so that they could present and elaborate President Reagan's response to the Soviet proposals.

The Soviet side accepted the U.S. request, which was immediately interpreted here as a signal that the deadlock might be broken. Observers do not exclude the possibility that this critical round could close with some results, even minimal, which would warm up the political climate during the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Geneva on November 19-20.

LCY PLENUM SESSION HEARS REPORT ON FEDERALISM

LD312307 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0632 GMT 31 Oct 85

["LCY Central Committee Session: Milan Kucan Introductory Report" -- TANJUG headline]

[Text] Belgrade, 31 Oct (TANJUG) -- This set of problems is of exceptional importance for our coexistence and ideopolitical work. The fact, however, remains that the LCY Central Committee has failed to examine more comprehensively the way in which the constitutional concept of our federation is being realized, although it has been evident that serious problems are affecting this sphere, and that there are even deviations from the constitutional principles. We cannot justify this delay. Precisely because of the LCY's passivity, some of the most important issues of our coexistence fail to be resolved, while phenomena and the tendency to question even the very foundations of Socialist Federal Yugoslavia and to dim our revolutionary movement's prospects are gaining ground.

We are also faced with the crucial question of whether and to what extent we shall be prepared to meet the challenges and trials of the 21st century with all the prospects for man's liberation that are being created by the previously unimaginable development of material forces of production. Current events in the world, and particularly in Europe, demonstrate convincingly enough that many states have succeeded in discovering very successful and efficient forms of integration and association based on genuine common interests. In this world in which no one can exist on his own, in which the many-sided traffic between and interdependence of both people and nations in material and spiritual production are functioning, our community cannot exist unless it opens up and acquires the capacity to participate in these processes and to make its own active creative contribution to them. Our positive experiences to date testify that the modern Socialist Yugoslav community of peoples of that kind, developing on the basis of a conscious observation of common interests and comprehensive interdependence, is possible, productive and the only one that could provide long-term prospects. It is being sustained by historically aware working people and their equal, democratically organized nations organized and integrated on the principles of self-management. Regardless of remaining differences in their levels of development, because of their common existence they have become modern nations which need universal economic, political and cultural freedom and recognition among the people of the world. If we succeeded in meeting that challenge, we shall fulfill our duty not only to the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia [AVNOJ] and our entire revolutionary achievements, but even more to our future.

This session can and must raise the issue of how to tackle the complex problems accumulated over the years, of our coexistence and of the functioning of our federation in such a way as to establish on well-known principles some uniform ideopolitical guidelines for the LCY's activities aimed at their effective elimination. The debate at the session is expected to fulfill two objectives: first, to clarify in light of the present situation some fundamental issues, and to reiterate the fundamental principles on which our federation has been developed; and second, to formulate the main directions and tasks of our further ideopolitical activitity in eliminating the causes of inefficiency in the functioning of the federation and inconsistency in the implementation of its constitutional concepts. To this end the Presidium has prepared a set of proposed positions which, amended and completed by today's debate, will serve as an effective basis for the political action and for our positions at the 13th LCY Congress.

It is necessary to clarify some of the basic principles referred to in the positions.

In practice, we are witnessing great differences in views, and even disputes in society, among Communists and to a considerable extent in the LC leaderships about the essence of these principles. This prevents us from successfully, creatively, and responsibly countering deadlocked situations and from tackling more efficiently the problems we encounter in practice. We must also shed light on the wave of various ideologically extreme attacks not only on our constitutional provisions but on the very foundations and character of Yugoslavia itself. It is precisely passivity, insensitivity, and opportunism, which have also permeated a considerable section of the LCY, that create a wide opening for conservative, reactionary, and even counterrevolutionary ideas and ideologies. Such ideas more and more aggressively disseminate confusion and disorientation in the already complex economic and political situation. If we continue to be passive and irresolute, we shall find ourselves increasingly isolated from the ideological and political events in society. But proceeding from the LCY's and Yugoslav society's great positive experience in tackling the national issue and enriching our common life, we must demonstrate that we are capable of explaining ideologically and theoretically the social nature and causes of these phenomena.

If we want to be united and successful in this action, we must provide a clear and unequivocal answer to the question of the origins of the present-day rash of attempts to dispute and ideologically and theoretically revise the basic historical facts about the causes, creation and character of Yugoslavia, its intranational relations, its sovereignty, and so forth. We must also establish why these attempts are occurring precisely at this moment; why admittedly not for the first time but more aggressively than ever before, there are attempts to rewrite history and our revolution, and in particular the character of our federation and its creation and development since the AVNOJ. Why is it that our recent and, increasingly frequently, not so recent past are being forced upon us as the main front for political struggle? Why is it that these attempts always intensify at the time when we are going through decisive stages of our revolutionary changes? This only strengthens their aggressive nature. The same is happening today in relation to the implementation of the stabilization program and our efforts to analyze and establish our tasks in eliminating the shortcomings in our political system.

All this points to the fact that in our society there are very different ideological and political tendencies which originate from objective differences in the level of development, awareness and ideological development, pragmatism and practicism as forms of social practice, and so forth. All of these factors create a wide scope for the activity of hostile elements which refuse to accept society's socialist development on the basis of self-management and even the basic principles of the 1974 constitution. It is precisely these elements that today are calling for the constitution to be revised. We have closed our eyes to these facts for far too long. It is absurd to expect that by right ideas and normative solutions alone we can thwart the resistance and implement the constitutional principles. What we need is social action and persistent efforts to implement these principles.

In this connection we must remind ourselves that the constitutional reform in the early seventies started as the reform of the federation. It soon became clear, however, that this was not possible to achieve without also changing production relationships, and unless freely associated labor is constituted and the working class' material, cultural and political position is strengthened on the basis of social ownership and socialist self-management. Thus, prerequisites were created for the development of a comprehensive socioeconomic and sociopolitical system. This system, by giving the worker the inalienable right to make decisions in expanded and social production through integrating labor and capital at his disposal, and thus abolishing hired labor, tackled in a completely new way the revolution's essential issue, that is, the control of the surplus of labor.

On this basis Yugoslavia continues to develop and function as a state and as a self-managing socialist community.

Given the character of these changes, it becomes apparent that calls for the revision of the system are mostly of statist and technobureaucratic origin. Their realistic weapon is our insufficient ability or readiness to stimulate, on the basis of self-managing production relationship and relations in the federation based on it, the creative search for joint solutions which would counter autarchic particularism and ideological ideas stemming from it and which would pave the way for the process of differentiation among us. In this way we would most successfully defend against the wave of statist ideologies which foments and stimulates autarchic particularism, development at the expense of others, and the efforts to control the process of decisionmaking regarding other people's labor, since the one who controls human labor can exercise control over human lives as well. Resistance by this form of ideology has become the main obstacle to our efforts to strengthen the working people's self-managing freedoms and rights. That is why there is so much formalism in the implementation and analysis of the constitution and the law on associated labor when they are not accompanied by changes in real social relations. This fact is sufficently substantiated by the serious shortcomings discernible in some normative solutions adopted by the federation, republics, and provinces after the promulgation of the constitution.

These problems, taken either as theoretical problems or problems of specific social practice, cannot be understood outside the context of the present time and space and the existing relationships of power between social forces within it. It would be very dangerous for our revolutionary movement if, in the present complex social situation and the conditions of an economic crisis, our movement fails to define the nature of that relationship and the centers of its social power, because without this it would be hard to establish reliable ways out of the crisis and to discover the forces that could be relied upon. We have already been in a situation where, owing to the urgency, some contradictory interventionist measures were used hastily and without long-term strategy to "correct the system." Some of these measures, objectively speaking, negate certain fundamental constitutional principles.

This is exactly what has recently been happening with the long-term economic stabilization program. Attempts to separate the process of stabilization from the struggle for self-management and the free pooling of labor and resources are being made. An indication of all this are discussions about the changes in the political system set in motion by the critical analysis of its functioning. The dilemma as to whether not only the political system, but even basic constitutional provisions should be changed is being forced upon society. The LC is even being called to account as the initiator of the action to develop it even further. The LC is being called upon to declare whether it is in favor of such changes or not.

Now the LCY has come up with a clear and unambiguous position, adopted at the 16th session. It is evident that the LC favors changes and has indicated what kind of changes, on what bases, and to what extent a new thesis has been raised that is aimed at confronting the long-term economic stabilization program with a critical analysis. It fails to mention, however, the very vital point, which is that both documents are derived from the constitution and the law on associated labor. Depriving the stabilization program in this way of its socioeconomic and self-managing socialist character and its revolutionary strength, the program is reduced to being regarded as a program of economic changes alone; and, thus "crippled", it is being declared as "society's supreme law." We must put an end to this kind of political manipulation because no one has the right to denounce on the pretext of some abstract freedom our society's strategy for emerging from the crisis.

Such criticism jeopardizes the fundamental values and achievements of the socialist revolution and our nations' and nationalities' lasting historical orientations and, in fact, each man's and each nation's already attained freedom. The creative debate will also demonstrate how untenable those theses are that interpret any proposal for changing individual institutional solutions or forms of organization as attacks on the constitutional system itself.

The work on a critical analysis of the functioning of the political system to date has shown, just as the earlier adopted stabilization program shows, that some essential objectives of the constitutional reform have not been implemented in a satisfactory and expected way. An informal and parallel system of decisionmaking, alongside and contrary to the constitutional system, has been created in social practice. Compromises and hesitations -- which to some extent resulted either from a lack of knowledge and experience in seeking correct answers to numerous dilemmas, or else from resistance to the difficult and complex work of converting nominal attitudes into institutional solutions -- enabled practice to retain what according to relations and proponents in decisionmaking is an old, statist system of social production. The long-term economic stabilization program and a critical analysis of the political system in this connection particularly point out solutions in the credit and monetary system and the system of business banking, in the system of planning, and the institutional organization of associated labor. It is precisely this parallel system which functions as an alternative set of formal and informal centers of decisionmaking for business, political, administrative, and executive-political structures. It also serves as a means of defending their social positions and power, which enabled the implementation of the main objective of the constitutional reform: the replacement of the class subject of decisionmaking about surplus labor. This resulted in a series of deformation and one-sided activity and development of certain institutions of the political system. The policy of issuing money, creation of undeclared assets in banks, irresponsible taking of loans abroad, and anticonstitutional misuse of associated labor funds led to the creation and strengthening of the material basis of social power of technocracy and bureaucracy in associated labor and in sociopolitical communities. It also led to the basis for their mutual conflicts over ambitious, often mistaken and unrealistic development plans.

These are the roots of autarchic economies, closing of the circulation currents and self-managing concentration of social accumulation in regional and republican-provincial borders, which results in wider disintegration in other areas of common life as well.

All this has a great impact on the practice of implementing constitutional relations in the federation. These relations are threatened with a wide front of non-self-management practice which has even its "natural" continuation in science, culture, and the entire spiritual production as well as in political life. A way out is often sought in the wrong place, primarily in the constitutional system itself rather than in the real causes which resulted in such a practice. This creates a feeling that we should reopen a discussion about the essential principles of Yugoslav togetherness, which on the basis of the principles of AVNOJ are established in the constitution. We should base this discussion on some kind of new principles, since not only is our Yugoslav community allegedly in crisis, but without essentially changing the fundamental assumptions on which it is based it can never emerge from this crisis. And everything that is positive -- and there is much more of that than there are present shortcomings -- everything that we have achieved in affirming self-managing equality, mutual responsibility of nations and nationalities in our Yugoslav community, in implementing and ensuring many common interests on the basis of the constitutional principle of reaching consensus and agreement between republics and provinces; all this is proclaimed as ineffective, because it does not satisfy a bureaucratic authority and the same kind of awareness.

In the name of such assessments which identify the present unsatisfactory situation with the principles on which the SFRY is based, those same dilemmas that were at the time of the constitutional reform and are the expression of the same type of ideologies, political polarizations and confrontations, are being raised again. It is a matter of theories which, under the influence of bourgeois, statist ideas, attempt to explain whether Yugoslavia is developing as a federation or as a confederation; whether the ways for its disintegration are open through the constitution; and what Yugoslavia should really be and what sort of relations there should be in it.

In their great desire to express disagreement with the existing Yugoslavia and with the historical direction of its development as an original historical creation of self-managing socialist system, they forget that life has even in the world of these bourgeois political states fundamentally changed their essence a long time ago. They also forget the fact that through the constitution, Yugoslav nations and nationalities very clearly agreed in what sort of state community and in what sort of mutual relations they wished to live. In this sort of community the independence of nations is greater, but at the same time on the basis of this sort of independence and equality there are also much wider ways for their integration. And none of the mentioned statist formulas from the past history of the bourgeois political state agrees with this.

Very often in the same context a question of the so-called AVNOJ continuity is raised and a correction of alleged deviations is demanded. The ideological and political messages of such demands are clear. They aim at disintegrating the constitutional concept of our federation based on the principles of AVNOJ. They do not refer to past but to present times and mostly to the future, particularly when they speak about the historical legitimacy of the existence and equal rights of some republics and provinces; that is, the nations and nationalities of the SFRY. Nationalism, which is growing increasingly in almost all parts of our country, wildly feeds on this. Nationalism is again being used as a means of struggle against socialist self-management and against the SFRY. Nationalism acts in the entire range of spiritual endeavors, from literature, historical science, and linguistics, to religion and sport. It seeks a stronghold primarily among young people; it wishes to poison relations in our community, and it could threaten everything that we have so far achieved, even the freedom of our nations and nationalities. We must ensure that we are sufficiently aware of these dangers, and that in our political explanations we are clearly distancing ourselves from nationalistic views and explanations of the interests of our nations and nationalities. They could enslave and overpower us, as we know from our not so ancient history.

We cannot seek solutions for the complex problems of modern Yugoslavia by turning to the past, thereby reopening questions to which our shared life gave convincing answers, and remaking history so that it can serve present pragmatic political interests and ideological decisions. Such discussions must not hinder us from the practical work and tasks with which we must now come to grips. If we have to argue, then it is by far more productive to argue over which solutions could reliably extricate us from the present difficulties.

Since the creation of AVNOJ, right up to the present, relations within our community have developed and changed depending on how our society developed; and it will be the same in the future. There is a strong continuity of fundamental principles and the implementation of the program of socialist revolution. These fundamental principles are established and worked out through the constitution.

It is true that there is no such firm continuity of institutions and forms in which such fundamental principles are being implemented; these institutions and forms have been changing depending on conditions and problems which had to be solved in society's development.

And that is precisely where their revolutionary character lies. Therefore what is under threat is not primarily institutions, but real interests for common life and social awareness of the working people of the nations and nationalities which unite them. The content and dimensions of each of these will in the future also determine the forms of institutional regulating of relations in the Yugoslav socialist state community. If we were to start from these principles and knowledge, I believe there would be fewer disagreements and extreme proposals about changing some institutional solutions in the federation, primarily in the structure of the Federal Assembly, a need to introduce councils of associated labor and social-political chambers, about the Federal Executive Council and so forth, as well as about the way and forms of decisionmaking.

It is obvious that a discussion on the activity of federation bodies and possible institutional changes is possible only on the basis of clearing up ideological platforms. Because of this, many proposals on how to ensure their effective functioning are contradictory and mutually opposing. The present slow movement in reaching agreements in the federation, and an attempt to turn it into a negotiating right of executive organs of republics and provinces, is the basis of proposals to abolish this principle of decisionmaking. Here it is not considered that it is precisely the process of reaching agreements and shared decisionmaking about vital interests of the people who live in a multinational community, who mutually permeate each other and supplement each other through their shared objectives and real interests, which is the most natural form of expressing unity of interests in such a community.

In pressures and attacks on this fundamental principle and in its one-sided application today, one can, as before, recognize statist, centralist, bureaucratic, and separatist tendencies; these introduce serious disturbances into intranational relations and stimulate nationalism and chauvinism. Therefore these tendencies demand careful ideopolitical identification and an analysis of the situation in society on which they feed and gain their social power. Every nationalism in our conditions necessarily assumes a form of a reactionary and anticommunist chauvinism. As such it always presents a hindrance for the progress of socialism, and it is directed against the interests of its own people on whose behalf it comes forward. In the multinational structure of Yugoslavia, in certain conditions it could even become a dominant form of antisocialist action. Thus, every "improvement" of relations in the federation that does not take into account the need for ensuring the interests which link the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, and primarily their equality, is utterly sensitive; even dangerous, not only for the stability of Yugoslavia but also for its socialist and communist prospects.

On the basis of these and similar attitudes a lack of understanding of national questions has developed. Basically, it means a refusal to accept the ways in which this question, on the bases of the ideopolitical attitudes of the LCY, has in principle been solved in Yugoslavia; how it was being solved with sufficient success; and is still being solved in social practice in the entire postwar period. This solution is based on the principle that Yugoslav nations, that is, their working class as the proponent of authority, have their right to dispose of conditions, means and results of their work and implement their sovereign rights in republics and provinces and in the federation as they have established it through constitution in common interest.

Most misunderstandings result from the principle that Yugoslav nations, that is, their working class, dispose of conditions, means, and results of their work within the conditions of social property, the existence of a united Yugoslav market and economic area.

This principle on its own means nothing when it comes tackling intranational relations, if, in accordance with the logic of our social and property relations of production and with an essentially increased responsibility and initiative on the part of republics and provinces, we were not to deal more speedily with unsolved problems of the socioeconomic, self-managing and political system; and more successfully find answers for the future shared socioeconomic development contained in the social plan of Yugoslavia.

This principle gains its sense only through an overall implementation of self-managing production relations which establish an immediate economic link between workers and their past labor. In the existing system of production this work is sliping out from workers' hands and is turning into an economic basis for the creation of financial and technocratic centers that become an alien force hovering over work and working people. Every integration of work and economically necessary concentration of the means of social production that is not based on self-managing relations provokes resistance from workers, because the results of investing these assets do not become a constitutent part of their income. If these sorts of relations are developing between workers and work collectives from the areas of various republics or provinces, they very easily also assume a character of intranational conflicts. This fact is very important for understanding and principal establishment of relations in the federation.

In the life of a nation, the very sense of freedom and equality and the creation of possibilities, so that it is unrestricted in its creative affirmation to freely dispose of the conditions and means for such an affirmation, has great importance. Without this no one nation can develop a total national superstructure, a material base for its social life, science, technology and culture, or can coordinate the development of production forces for the future and link up, on a basis of equality and comprehensively, with others in the Yugoslav community and beyond. Experience teaches us that not one of our nations or nationalities can solve on its own the accumulated problems of its economic, cultural and general social development. However, this process is possible among equal nations as a result of the realization of each of them that such cooperation and integration is the only possible road to the realizationof its own interests. The national freedom and economic independence of a nation is the condition and basis for the rapprochement and linking up of nations and for the strengthening of their equality in contemporary conditions, and not its obstacle. These realizations ought to be fully respected in the system and practice of social planning, and particularly in the adoption of the social plan of Yugoslavia. This democratic agreement on common socioeconomic development, in which we ensure the realization of the advantages and potential which we have as a community to the greatest degree, and the conditions for the optimal development of each of our republics and provinces and individual parts of associated labor, is a vehicle for the integration of our society and not for its disintegration and unprincipled confrontation.

The nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia can regulate their relations only on these principles, so long as both the very socialist self-management structure of society, the unified system of socioeconomic and political relations, the unified market, international political development and the position of each of them and all of them together in the SFRY in the past and, even more so today, and other interests of community life, lead them to still more intensive mutual interlinking and cooperation in the framework of the Yugoslav federal community. The unity of our nations and nationalities does not rest solely on economic calculations; rather they are linked initially by a common progressive consciousness, treated in the revolution and the common historical fate and interests of defense and independence and freedom in this stormy area.

This, however, does not diminish by one iota the importance of the fact that this unity can be preserved only in a socialist self-managing community on the basis of real common interests and needs, especially the development of their material productive forces and the creative capacities of the working class. So long as these interests are guaranteed by the equal position of the nations and nationalities and the entire social relations in the community, there is no danger either to the fate of Yugoslavia, which unitarists are so "worried" about, nor to the sovereignty of individual nations, which nationalists and separatists are "frightened" about. Kardelj said about this: "If we are not clear that socialism is what unites Yugoslavia, then no other kind of factor can unite it, and when I say socialism I mean social progress on the basis of socialism."

Precisely in order to strengthen the factors which link the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, one must determine the functions and role of the federation as well as its structure and the way that it functions, It is necessary to discover the real common interests from which both the forms, relations of mutual dependence, duties and rights, solidarity and reciprocity necessarily originate and use them as the starting point. They are laid down in the constitution, in accordance with the present degree of our development. Our community will become strong and succeed in democratically surmounting the internal contradictions in its own development only if it bases itself on the real unity of interests of all nations and nationalities, and not on their etatist-unitarist or separatist arbitrary interpretation, in a way in which they do not exist, either jointly or separately in life.

From the whole body of constitutional principles on the equality of nations and nationalities and their republics and provinces, it emerges that the starting points for the realization of common interests are the principles of reaching agreement, the equality of the subjects of this process of reaching agreements, responsibility for one's own and common development, and solidarity and reciprocity. Both the forms and the method of decisionmaking in the federation are established on these principles, by negotiations and agreement-reaching of the republics and provinces and by means of majority decisionmaking. These forms and methods are, in the existing real relations, indispensible, consciously adopted, and constitutionally established democratic forms of decisionmaking. Without respect for these principles and decisionmaking methods in the federation, our democracy will not be a factor of the consciously adopted order in society, but a source of political instability in which socialist self-management can be endangered and with it democracy itself.

It is unacceptable, however, to equate negotiation and agreement-reaching with the classic right of veto. To absolutize this right, transform it into a means of our disagreement and thus compromise it -- because if the right of veto is taken as a general principle, and there is a tendency toward this in existence, -- this in practice rules out any democratic decisionmaking, because it opens the door to direct confrontation, pressures, and insurmountable conflicts, which must result in the restoration of state force, unitarism and dictatorship. Our present situation in connection with the adoption of decisions in the SFRY Assembly indicates this only too well. Political action ought thus to be equally sensitive both toward "the tyranny of the majority," which is especially dangerous in a multinational community, as well as toward "the tyranny of the minority" which, with a right of veto and without well-founded reasons and without an appreciation of the legitimate interests of others, would be able to impose its minority view.

Deformations like these cannot be equated with the constitutional position and rights of the republics and provinces in decisionmaking by means of the agreement of their assemblies in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces on questions directly concerning the management of surplus labor and their real equality.

This originates from the fact that the nations of Yugoslavia, as equal and free nations, have united into a community which guarantees them this right and whose character and the relations in it cannot be changed without their expressed agreement. This is the essential part of self-managing relations that is built into the foundations of our federation. In this respect the meaning of our constitutional solutions is quite clear. It is the right and responsibility of every republic and province to give or not to give its agreement to individual acts if they would mean the breakdown of its equality. When, in keeping with this, individual decisions in the SFRY Assembly are not adopted, this cannot a priori be proclaimed as the political destruction of one republic or province and it cannot be maintained that this is the breakdown of the system and a tragedy for Yugoslav democracy. It is necessary above all to understand the reasons for such a course, because such a situation is more democratic than centralist. This can also easily mean hegemonistic violence against the interests and rights of one nation, one republic or province, or rather the working class within it, to handle the conditions and fruits of its labor and decide on its other essential interests which are established in the constitution.

It cannot be expected that in our complex situation, in which objectively contradictory interests exist, agreement can always be reached smoothly and without delay. However, it is the great duty and responsibility of the organs of the republics and provinces and of the federation, and especially of the Communists in their responsible positions within them, to do everything, mindful of the united ideopolitical directions and the rights and responsibilities of the republics and provinces for their own and joint development, to successfully complete this often very complex and difficult process and not to hinder it with proposals that do not have a firm foundation in the constitution or by making their own interests absolute. In the event that there is no decision by this means and that agreement is not reached, our society must nevertheless function; it should not be incapacitated to the extent that it is ruled by chance and the momentary relationship of forces. This is why, built into the system, there are temporary measures which should be applied and which are, true enough, extreme but nevertheless democratic means of decisionmaking in the federation, and which are adopted with the full responsibility of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, the Federal Executive Council, and SFRY Presidency. A temporary measure requires that the LCY and all subjective forces mobilize themselves immediately in order to agree on positions as soon as possible and reach the most suitable solutions for stability even with regard to those questions on which agreement was not reached. Maybe it is not the most opportune moment to note a frequently forgotten truth. Our struggles for the visions which we have set ourselves and which are the meaning of our practical activity, cannot and should not release us from the responsibility of resolving specific and sometimes very pragmatic problems; it is precisely on these solutions, their essence and efficacy, that the fate of these visions mostly depends.

In majority decisionmaking as well, by which many vital quesitons of our community are resolved, we should proceed from the fact that the federation is not some "authority over the republics and provinces", but is also a democratic form through which they, or rather the nations and nationalities and working people and citizens, realize the specific functions of their own sovereignty and statehood. The fact that decisions on these functions are made by the majority does not contradict their meaning because out of agreement on the joint realization of these functions arises also mutual trust, commitments, and responsibilities. In order to guarantee that the organs of the federation as the joint organs of our whole community carry out their functions effectively in a democratic way and by democratic means, and that they adopt decisions and concern themselves with their implementation, we must guarantee through our entire political work that they look increasinly for support to the organized socialist forces of the basic people's mass organizations, the working class and all working people via the delegate system and Socialist Alliance, with the special role and responsibility of the LC.

Otherwise, it is impossible to achieve the permeability of the system and to open it up to the initiatives and interests of the working class and working people from municipality level through the republics and provinces and right up to the federation level. The incomplete development of this practice, and lack of negotiations and agreement-reaching, compromise our community.

All this also has an effect on the implementation of the decisions and laws discussed in the proposed positions. We are justifiably dissatisfied with the situation, but tht cannot be a reason for seeking solutions in a different way of decionmaking, or a redistribution of jurisdiction between the republics and the federation. The method of implementation is not coordinated with the nature of delegate relations on the basis of which decisions are reached. The delegates in the workers' councils and other self-managing organs, as well as in the delegate assemblies, should in keeping with their positions and function, bear their part of the responsibility and be the exponents of activities aimed at implementing decisions of their self-managing communities, in the municipalities, republics and provinces. This assumes, of course, that they are a real factor in agreeing on positions and adopting decisions. This is an inseparable, integral part of their rights, duties and responsibilities in the assembly chambers. This conscious activity, which is an expression of their own interest and democratic responsibility and class solidarity, cannot replace the institutional responsibility of the executive councils, administrations, inspectorates, and judicial organs. This is why delegates are obliged to inform each other in the SFRY Assembly about the implementation of these laws in their own republics and provinces, being aware of the fact that it is precisely the failure to carry out such joint decisions which threatens the interests and rights of others, and thus the stability of the community as a whole. Without these moves it is impossible to affirm the SFRY Assembly as a delegate organ of political control or to establish within it the principle of the unity of legislative and executive government.

The real power of statism and the danger which its dominance poses in relations within the whole community represent a great impediment in talks on the functioning of the federation. Statism, which has maintained the material basis of the power it has created, is the reality which has the greatest effect on the distortion of relations in the federation and on deviations in practice from constitutionally envisaged concepts. The monopoly of the federal state in managing the means of social production has been largely formally decentralized in the constitution, but not as far as self-managing associated labor. This process has been halted at the level of the republics and provinces. The focus for political guardianship over associated labor has been taken over by the executive political centers of the republics and provinces. The process leading to the breakdown of statism has not been carried out consistently in the federation either, especially in some areas upon which the self-managing position and the decisionmaking by workers in associated labor and their organizations and communities depend, such as the system of prices, the banking system with the issue of money, the foreign exchange and credit system, and so forth. The process of decentralization of decisionmaking on production has not been transformed into a process of breaking down its statism. Instead of associated labor, the organs of the republican and provincial "states" are the exponents of development' instead of the self-managing plan we have the state plan; instead of banks of associated labor we have state republican banks. The uniform market has disintegrated, particularly in the area of expanded production and accumulation, into a series of unlinked segments; it has lot the ability to effect the rational distribution and allocation of the means of accumulation. The illusion has thus been created that this function can only be successfully carried out by the state.

Technobureaucratism as the political expression of statism has become the main source of nationalism and various kinds of fragmentation and isolationism. This is the situation with which we are faced. And this is not the constitutional concept -- that the working class of each nation disposes of the created surplus of labor -- because this decisionmaking has been alienated from the worker. Nor is it the constitutional idea of the republic, according to which they are the national states of associated labor, which serve the realization of national and class interests.

We need to see what is the position of our leadership in his, in the creation of such a state of our own party decisions. As early as 1971, at the time of the reform of the federation, Tito and Kardelj pointed out the great danger that could threaten the whole of Yugoslavia if the means and function of the federal state were taken over from associated labor by the state and political executives of the republics. They would then, with considerable social resources, multiplying bank funds, and foreign capital at their disposal, come into conflict with the Yugoslav economic area as the supposed defenders of "their own" associated labor, "their own" republic, and "their own" nation.

It is clear to all of us that the present situation is untenable, and that as Communists we cannot tolerate it. Because, if the republic states continue strengthening as the representatives of a nation and as the exponents of decision-making on social reproduction, the constitutional model for relations in the federation cannot be achieved. But it must also be clear that it is just as bad to seek solutions in the strengthening of the federal state, instead of in the dispossession of the republican state to the advantage of associated labor. The removal of the right of the working class of individual nations and nationalities to determine the conditions and results of their labor and thus a return to centralism would pose an even greater threat to the realization of socialist togetherness in Yugoslavia, to the brotherhood and unity of our nations and nationalities.

One-sided accusations against the republics and provinces and attacks on their constitutional rights as the only culprit for "the crisis of togetherness," do not lead to a solution of our problems. Such an option can be a solution only for the bureaucratic chief enslaved by centralist concepts who sees Yugoslavia's greatest misfortune in the existence of its nations and nationalities, its republics and provinces. However, they are a historical fact, and the ability and wisdom of the country's leadership must speak out precisely for the respect of such historical realities and not speculate how it would be easier and better for all of us, and some inparticular, if Yugoslavia were a one-nation and centralist structure.

It is pointless to conjecture about which form of statism is less dangerous, the federal or the republican. What is important is something elese, neither republican, nor provincial, nor federal statism depends on some or other relations between the republic but on the real socieconomic relations in our country. Only if we Yugoslav Communists struggle united and persistently against all nonself-managing tendencies, both statist and technobureaucratic, and private and group property tendencies, will we succeed in destroying the roots of statism in society and government over people. This is for us a real revolutionary task, and to this end we must mobilize the working class, all progressive forces in society, and all nations. There is no other social force which would or could do this!

Consideration of this problem demands that we point out the phenomenon in society and in the LC which we have called "the wave of non-Marxist views onthe state and statehood." It is essential that in the ideopolitical work of the LCY as a whole, far more attention is devoted to the explanation and affirmation of Marxist viewpoints on the state and sovereignty, on its class content and the ways in which it should wither away.

There is a fairly strong tendency in this complex social situation to seek solutions by strengthening the functioning of the state and affirming it as the basis for the concept of the nation and its emancipation, as the only and greatest expression of national sovereignty. These ideas and concepts cannot be, and have never been, the ideas and aims of our movement. We have always had as our main strategic concern the question of government and its class component. Only with the acquisition of power in the revolution and the national liberation struggle by the working class, in other words the realization of this basic strategic task, did the question of the state arise. Our revolutionary movement considered from the beginning that it was a question of the state's withering away, because the state in the conditions of the socialist revolution was a class organization of the majority in relation to the minority, and precisely because of that it contained, and with the development of self-management contains, within itself an increasing number of elements of its own withering away. The technical and technological revolution and the changes brought about by it in the structure of the working class change none of this. They stress even more the increasing importance of the working class for the success of the struggle against new forms of alienation and tendencies toward independence of the centers of military, political, financial and economic power, and the imposition of their interests above the interests of their own working class and other nations and countries of the world.

In the measure in which self-management is developing, conditions are being created for the withering away of the state. This does not mean that our society does not need the state and its functions, but we must be aware of its changed character in the conditions of socialist self-management, because otherwise we as a movement would lose our links with our long term goals -- the creation of a communist society. The exponent of sovereignty in such a society can only be the working class, which is also the foundation of equality and cooperation of every nation and nationality with other nations and nationalities in the Yugoslav socialist federal community, based on self-management and not the intervention of the state.

In this connection I would like to recall Tito's words in a conversation with the leadership of the Croatian Central Committee on the eve of its session in Kardjordjevo in 1971, which have general and current importance. Tito strongly warned on that occasion against tendencies and efforts by which "the question of relations toward the working class, the role of the working class, and the role of the producer take second or third place," and he thus raised the question as to what kind of sovereignty and what kind of state was wanted. "Should it be a classical state, some kind of state which is your goal, or should it be a socialist community of working people, producers, a community of self-management?" He called for it not to be forgotten that we "began a long time ago to talk about the withering away of the state" and that the working class would be very unhappy if a state was now created in which it was "again the toiling class, as is the essence of every state."

A rather conspicuous phenomenon of the manifestation of statism and its external attributes is present in all our republics and provinces, though we have not recognized deeper causes of such tendencies. That is, the questions of independence, autonomy and sovereignty are not always raised as a prerequisite and a foundation for linking, cooperation and association with other nations and countries. On the contrary, in order to isolate oneself within one's borders and even to prove that in our history there are many more differences than commonalities, these questions in a multinational society, obviously, can always again be raised in their new or old form. I mention them in order to remind ourselves where their solution might take us if we were to abandon basic ideological and theoretical attitudes of our movement, since seeking solutions through strengthening republican and provincial states on statist bases necessarily leads to their confrontation and disturbs the stability of Yugoslavia.

This is particularly dangerous in conditions when the worker does not control the surplus labor, so that on this basis republican and provincial capital is being created; following the logic of profit, their interests are conflicting. There is no solution on this sort of platform. This is neither the platform of AVNOJ nor of the constitution. Not only does it lead to mutual isolation and autarchy of the republics and provinces, but also it causes within their borders leading structures to turn exclusively to their own working class and workers united on the principles of self-management. These leading structures, on behalf of their workers, control the surplus of labor and political power and thus de facto they become the proponent of national sovereignty.

This should clearly indicate the direction of our action. It is the overcoming of present delays in developing self-management and strengthening a realistic basis for shared life, equality, and free development of all our nations and nationalities, based on the historical interest of the working class.

This direction is also a prerequisite for solving specific problems of constitutional relations in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which is our shared and very sensitive problem. The positions adopted by the LCY Central Committee Presidium as a basis for further ideopolitical activity of Communists on strengthening unity and togetherness in the Socialist Republic of Serbia stress the necessity to implement as consistently as possible the constitutional conception of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and its unity and sovereignty, as well as constitutional conceptions of the socialist autonomous provinces. These positions, which were unanimously adopted with active participation and contribution from the presidiums of the Serbian LC Central Committee and Kosovo and Vojvodina Provincial Committees, have already been published. It was proposed that they should be verified at this session of the LCY Central Committee. There is no need for me to explain all aspects of the complexity of the problem and attitudes which they contain. I should only like to say that as Communists we should be very alert, have the greatest interest in and responsibility for fully implementing constitutional principles on the position of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the socialist autonomous provinces in present conditions, and thus eliminate from political life a very huge problem that burdens our overall relations. If any section of our community feels that it is not equally treated, it is a very big political problem for all of us; and eliminating its causes must be our shared task.

In positions which we shall adopt at today's session, we have tried to give a clear answer to the question of how to prevent further strengthening of tendencies of social disintegration, so that our system would not start functioning as a sum of unconnected parts. In practice, it is the independence of individual subjects which is more strongly ensured than unity and togetherness of the whole, since more care is taken about one's own development than about the responsibility for common development. The separating of rights from responsibilities, as well as rights to independence from responsibilities and obligations toward common interest, does not lead to developing socialist self-management as a global social relation and integrated system. However, the vital interests of work and workers in associated labor, their organizations and communities, inseparably and crucially connect them in social production, in business relations, and in acquring income on a united market as well as in relations with foreign partners. On this basis there is an increasing number of examples from our social practice which show that workers from many organizations of associated labor from different republics and provinces immediately associate themselves in view of both their own and common interests. They rationally pool labor and resources, develop complementary economy, and through distributing work, integration and creation of common income, they realize their own interests in accordance with essential social interests. Unlike the structures outside associated labor they understand very well that the development of production forces and creation of income demands integration as a prerequisite for successful solving the development and other problems of the present time and future.

These are the foundations on which self-managing associated labor is increasingly becoming the main factor of international integration and strengthening socialist self-managing unity. It is important that through subjective action in practice and in the system we eliminate hinderances to self-managing association, to open it up as much as possible and develop in it the initiative of the working man for association with other working people through various forms of realizing common interests. Preventing self-managing association and every attempt at isolating economic development within local and national, that is, republican and provincial borders, is contrary not only to the interest of working class but to the interest of the nation.

Because of these reasons, attacks on the right of the working class to decide about conditions and results of its work together with other people in its republic and, as one of the essential prerequisites for implementing equality and togetherness in Socialist Yugoslavia, to develop its economy as part of Yugoslav economy, are unfounded. There is lot of vagueness connected with this question, most often expressed as an imposed dilemma about whether we should have a united Yugoslav market or national economies. The question is complex, but after all it was answered in the principal assumptions of the long-term economic stabilization program, which was adopted at the 12th LCY Congress. It is clear that these national economies could not be created in any way other than on the principle of a united self-managing production relation and workers' self-management, which is the cohesive force of Yugoslavia. The united market which unites all these economies makes them mutually dependent on and complementary to each other, because the system of united social and economic relations and the forces of economic laws compel them to this. Our practice, however, is very often contrary to this sort of attitude. Unclear views with respect to relations toward national economies exist particularly because in practice these economies are linked to national capital and alientated from the working class and self-managing associated labor; they try to work as isolated, low productive, autarchic, unconnected, and competitive economies. If we want to develop clear views on these questions we would have to confront with more determination and with a more clear platform the unconstitutional practice in which statist structures outside associated labor usurp real rights of associated workers and develop "their own" autarchic economy outside the logic of economic laws, an economy which violates the united Yugoslav market and is economically and politically breaking Yugoslavia apart.

The realization of such a concept also demands the realization of an appropriate institutional, production-functional, and social organization of associated labor. The significance of this question had been considerably underestimated until the adoption of the long-term economic stabilization program and critical analysis of the functioning of the political system. However, now, faced with disastrous consequences we are quickly proposing inconsistent and partial moves. It is a fact that after the adoption of the law on associated labor the organizational forms and institutional organizing of associated labor has changed, though not the real situation and relations. Therefore, negative disintegration tendencies which were pperceived earlier have continued. The formation of organizations of associated labor was not accompanied by efforts to create new integration in the production of those sections of associated labor which shared common interests and were mutually dependent; on new social, property and income bases. The foundation of organizing associated labor, not even after the adoption of the constitution and the law on associated labor, has not become the pooling of labor and resources. The already mentioned solutions in the economic system and development policy, since they did not have real social and economic substance, also contributed to this situation, as well as hesitations surrounding the application of economic laws. Institutional forms of organizing in associated labor have been essentially deformed in relation to the constitutional conception. The system as a whole has neither stimulated nor compelled workers, associated in basic organizations of associated labor, to associate themselves, to pool their income, to control economically their past labor.

Rather, it allowed them to supplement their income in more favorable conditions of economic activity in a local, isolated market, in obtaining loans and cheap credits, often through irrational investments, and so forth. All this could be solved in the existing conditions only by technobureaucratic structures of social and political communities in the conditions of closed market. We have not managed to create forms of adequate organizing in associated labor, nor have we so far found the most suitable forms so that the integration [words indistinct] of the republics and provinces and the federation into the delegate and assembly system. Without such solutions, the proposals of positions also starts from this. It is not possible to implement an integrated conception of associated labor, or to maintain its function as the main subject in intra-national integration of Yugoslav society and strengthening socialist self-managing togetherness. It is also impossible to implement the constitutional conception of the republics and provinces as communities of associated labor. We must set this as our most immediate task.

While indicating the causes of the difficulties in the implementation of constitutional relations in the federation, the session today should also point out the considerable deviations in the activity of the LC in relation to its role as established by the LCY Statute and the way it is implemented. The public discussion in connection with the 13th session of the LCY Central Committee gave a clear indication of that. It is a fact that the discussions on the problems of federalism and LCY unity in our country have long been in progress. The same applies to the discussions as to whether there are differences between the system in the federation and the system within the LCY and as regards the extent of these differences; also, whether unified LCY action, which is an essential condition of socialist self-management and democracy based on this self-management, is adequate enough. This is not an occasion to begin a broadly based discussion on these issues, but it should be stressed that the principles on which the relations within the LCT are based are the result of our practical historic experience and theoretical perception. These principles cannot be called into question without also calling into question the leading role of the LC, nor do these principles prevent the necessary unity. On the contrary. This is why one should carefully examine why the party is being bureaucratized, and why there is a possibility for its being separated from the class and progressive social forces. We must examine its inadequate success in always being asserted as a vanguard of this class and as an organization of the democratic trust on the part of our working people of every nation and nationality in our country who acknowledge the working class as the leading class in our society and among our people. The consequence of this bureaucratization is the federalization of the LCY, which is making the attainment of ideopolitical unity more and more difficult. This is turning the awareness of one section of the membership in the wrong direction; that is, some propose that we should do away with the republican and provincial Leagues of Communists and reduce them to administrative-organizational outposts of the party center. As the result, both they and the center would lose the characteristic of the vanguard of the working class.

The demand for unity must always proceed from the fact that the application of democratic centralism must be linked with the effort to strengthen democracy in the LC, and with the provision of full possibility for the participation by the membership and organization in the discussion on and in the shaping of policy.

The independent initiative and responsibility of individual LC organizations to contribute to the formulation and a consistent implementation of the unified LCY policy cannot be minimized; on the contrary, it must be strengthened. In addition, democratic centralism must not be allowed to turn into bureaucratic centralism.

We do not require lip service, monolithic unity, obedience, or false unity; what we require is unity of action. This is why today, as indeed in every complex situation when the LC was seeking a way out within the context of its own further democratization and of decentralization of society, a clear and frank discussion on these issues is the best way to strengthen genuine unity. Democratization of our political life has today attained such an extent that at virtually all LC levels a political decision can be reached through an exchange of views and coordination of the views and positions, so much so that sometimes a vote is superfluous. Of course, one must ensure that all these standpoints proceed from the same strategic platform of the LCY and the historic interests of the working class. Thus, this method of adopting uniform standards and conclusions is not at odds with the principle of democratic centralism if it ensures that a political decision accepted by everyone and binding on all parts of the LCY has been taken. The principle of democratic centralism -- that is, the decisions made by the majority -- which continues to be necessary and indisputable, is not an end in itself. One should recall the view put forward by Lukacs that "the ultimate and the only right measure can be only whether a specific method of activity is in keeping with the implementation of the objective; that is, with the meaning of socialist development."

However, we must be realists here. In the present social conditions, the LCY must reach more quickly joint specific agreements on which different views exist. The democracy, whose objective is socialism, is not only discussion, struggle and a free presentation of views. It is a revolutionary action requiring efficient decision-making and efficient implementation of decisions. It is thus in the interests of the historic objectives of our movement, and also of democratic relations within it, ceaselessly to establish unity in it, parallel with the respect for the specific characteristics of the LCY as a unified organization made up of the LC's of the republics and provinces. Otherwise, this internal democracy and agreement-seeking would break down under the pressure of contradictions and conflicts created by an inability to act, accumulation of unresolved problems and the loss of prospects for our movement and society. It follows, therefore, that in conditions of independent activity and as regards the key questions of social development and policy, forms of democratically overcoming the differences in views and of collective decisionmaking have to be developed, in which it must always be absolutely clear who is responsible for what. On this basis a struggle can and must be fought against all attempts to undermine the LCY unity. We shall soon surmount the differences which exist if we perceive them and jointly overcome them in an atmosphere of comradeship, reciprocal trust, and conviction that we want the same thing and that we have the same revolutionary goal.

The entire LCY and its Central Committee must involve themselves increasingly directly on this basis, in keeping with their constitutional role, in the solution of the most important outstanding questions and problems in the functioning of the federation and in the implementation of the joint interests which we are discussing today. We must constantly address ourselves to this task, especially within the context of the delegate mechanism of the federation. Otherwise, we will not respond to our revolutionary role today, nor will the big party debates and involving the people on this have any meaning or outcome. The vital problems of this country will then be resolved without reference to us, in a haphazard way and under the crucial influence of the balance of forces at any one time.

In the present-day world, in which the tendency to reciprocal cooperation and links is very pronounced, there can be no doubt that Yugoslav society, that is, all our nations and nationalities, will find enough strength to resist the tendencies of misinformation and wrecking. The preservation, stability, and development of the Yugoslav community is in their elementary interest.

This is why we must behave in such a way as to make our contribution to the strongest possible reciprocal links on constitutional foundations; and in such a way that our life together may be as fruitful as possible. We must always rapidly seek to arrive at joint and best solutions, so we may creatively weave individual and special interests into our common interests, not to the detriment of any one section of the SFRY, but in the interest of strengthening its ability to go on being an active and equal factor in the world and the Nonaligned Movement. We must always struggle for peace and equality, so that the brotherhood and unity of our nations and nationalities may go from strength to strength and develop. In this context the LC's initiative and creative activity are irreplaceable for the contribution and the responsibility to have Yugoslavia built and developed further as a socialist, self-management and democratic community of equal nations and nationalities.

It should not be superfluous to recall on this occassion once again that the present shortcomings and imponderables in the functioning of our system are not so crucial, especially if we are capable of overcoming and eliminating them in our political practice. What is essential are the prospects of freedom which the system is ushering in. It depends on us, on the LCY and on our unity, whether we shall make use of these opportunites which are incomparably more extensive than those which any democratic system in the history of mankind so far could have provided, or whether through bad practice, unless we change it, we shall discredit the system itself.

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